UNION SEMINARY QUARTERLY REVIEW

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VOLUME XI, NUMBER 2 JANUARY 1956

TOYNBEE

CHRISTIANITY AND NON-CHRISTIAN FAITHS

JEFFERY

THE CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO THE RELIGIONS OF THE EAST

NIEBUHR

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE AND AN ECONOMY OF ABUNDANCE

HOON

THE RELATION OF THEOLOGY AND MUSIC IN WORSHIP

BLIZZARD

THE TRAINING OF THE PARISH MINISTER

DILLEY

THE QUEST FOR A BIBLICAL METAPHYSIC

BOOK REVIEWS

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TO PROMOTE THOUGHT AND ACTION IN THE SERVICE OF CHRIST

VOLUME XI, NUMBER 2 JANUARY 1956

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Quadrangle Notes

With the shortening of the days in late fall and early winter has come a lengthening of the hours spent both in the usual and immediate pursuits of the students and faculty, and in a variety of other intellectual, social, dramatic, and musical activities. The Junior Class celebrated their Exodus from the land of the Pentateuch Paper with a festival in Hastings, the Seminary community observed the Advent season with a play, music, and worship, and several series of lectures by visiting and resident professors evoked serious comment from most corners of the Seminary.

The first of these series of lectures, the Hewett Lectures, was given by Professor Arnold Toynbee on November 1, 2, and 3. The Seminary community found Toynbee's conception of history and his study of Christianity in the context of comparative religion very provocative.

Professor Daniel D. Williams gave a series of five lectures from October 24 to November 21 on "The Christian Faith and Contemporary Problems: New Directions and Basic Issues in Christian Theology Today". The titles of these lectures are as follows: "Preaching the Gospel Today: Tensions and Resources in the American Churches", "Can Man Save Himself: Grace and the New Psychology", "God and the Philosophers: Time, Personality, and Deity", "Jesus Christ and World Redemption: What is Universal in the Gospel?" and "Moral Problems in the Life of Faith: Decision, Vocation, and Social Action." These constituted the Eighth Annual Series of Auburn Extension Lectures and were very highly regarded by those who heard Professor Williams speak.

A study of the functions of the parish minister has been made by Professor Blizzard under a grant made by the Russell Sage Foundation. While there has been no public report made yet of the results of Professor Blizzard's investigations, the faculty has met three times, to discuss his findings.

In addition to the main currents of Seminary activity, there have been the eddies stirred up by various groups following their particular interests. The wives have received two lectures on theology from Professor Brown, the Junior and Middle Classes have had their Retreats, the student denominational groups have once again come together, and the Overseas Students have had a series of meetings throughout the fall.

The Seminary began the celebration of the Advent Season on November 29 with a production by the students of John Masefield's verse play, "The Coming of Christ," with music by Gustav Holst. The play, "the story of Christ clothed in simple, poetic language," was directed by Professor Seaver and Professor Ifor Jones of the School of Sacred Music. Two other observances of the Season followed in short order: The Christmas Fireside and the Christmas Party for the entire Seminary Community. As the last celebration before the Seminary recessed for Christmas Vacation, the Candlelight Carol Service, conducted by Dr. Hugh Porter, was held on December 19.

Now, as we return in January to our meetings and studies, we find that once again there is "the Time Being to redeem from insignificance." The faculty, the wives, the Overseas Group, and the Board of Directors, all have met at least once since their return. Once again the students and faculty alike are going through the final preparations for exams and the end of the first semester.

Christianity and Non-Christian Faiths

Arnold J. Toynbee

If the great religions of the world are to approach each other, they must find common ground. I think that common ground is there. The most important piece of common ground is one, I think, that has always existed since mankind first came into existence. That common ground is human nature, especially the self-centeredness which is the original sin in human nature. I think that was the challenge in response to which all the higher religions have arisen. As I have suggested several times, the positive response to this challenge is very different in the different cases, but all of them are grappling with the same problem. It is no accident, I think, that the higher religions as we know them today all came into existence within a certain period of time, within something less than a thousand years of one another. They all made their appearance in the world after original sin had shown its power by causing the downfall of one or two generations of secular civilizations. They came, that is, at a moment when mankind had received humiliating and surprising setbacks in its endeavors, setbacks which opened the way for humility, which opens the way for spiritual illumination.

For practical purposes, I think human nature can be taken as uniform and permanent. If there has been any change since the rise of the first civilization, only about five thousand years ago, this change has been so slight as to be imperceptible. The period of time with which I am dealing in considering the living higher religions is even less than five thousand years. They enter the stage of history about two thousand years after the dawn of the earliest civilization, so within the last two or three thousand years the change in human nature, if there has been any change at all, has been infinitesimal.

There is above that fundamental common ground, a common

ground in the present state of the world, in the unification of the world by modern western civilization. First, the annihilation of distance by modern western technology. That has made all the particular problems of the world global today. Of course, human nature, as I say, was always uniform; original sin was always spread wherever mankind carried it, but the particular, historical workings-out of original sin might occur in one province of the world in the past without affecting other provinces. Today, we are all of us one another's keepers in the sense that any working out of original sin in any one part of the world immediately affects the rest of the human race. That is a new factor caused by the annihilation of distance.

There is also the replacement of Christianity by technology as western man's foremost concern, which has allowed the worship of collective human power to reassert itself, this time armed by technology and animated by Jewish and Christian fanaticism. Then there is a movement for the emancipation of power which flows from the worship of collective human power, and also a movement for the emancipation of individuals, formerly penalized classes of individuals—women, industrial workers, peasants, natives,—which flows from the worship of the pursuit of individual happiness.

I suggest that the emancipation of the leviathan is contrary to all that Christianity and the other higher religions stand for. Higher religions and leviathan cannot co-exist permanently; but on the other hand, the movement for the emancipation of individuals could be redeemed by being reconsecrated. Now the worshipers of leviathan, whether they are Fascist, Nazi, or Communist, jeer at the liberal democratic worshipers with their pursuit of individual happiness. They jeer at them for putting their treasure in such a trivial aim as this, and indeed they have a case, if individual happiness, secular individual happiness, is pursued as an end in itself. The attainment of a secular higher standard of living, not merely a material one but one including a number of spiritual values, is always unsatisfying. True individual happiness can be pursued and found if the aim is to liberate the individual for attaining the true end of man: to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever.

To emancipate individual souls in this spiritual sense is the traditional common aim of all the higher religions. They have all addressed themselves to all men. Each of them has preached a

new way of individual salvation, not just to a privileged minority, but to all mankind without distinction of sex or race or class. So it seems that the higher religions can not only come to terms with the present world-wide movement for the emancipation of individual souls; it is the higher religions, and they alone that can give this movement significance and satisfaction by bringing it back to its true spiritual goal. The ultimate inspirations, I have suggested, come from the Christian belief that individual souls have a supreme value for God. Here there seems to be a possibility of harmonizing all the main movements in the contemporary world, except the worship of leviathan, whether it takes the nationalist form or the Communist form.

Modern western technology too seems here to have a constructive and beneficent part to play. It is true that merely a material raising of the standard of living is unsatisfying if that is pursued as an end in itself. A higher level of spiritual life is not ultimately compatible with gross social injustice. The saints have embraced poverty, I think, for several distinct reasons: in order to share the common lot of the mass of mankind, and also in order to extricate themselves from the spiritually destructive effect of material welfare when it is the monopoly of a privileged minority. Now, modern western technology is making social injustice avoidable, and is therefore making it intolerable.

The higher religions all believe in the consecration of human personalities, though they differ from one another in their prescriptions for consecrating souls by bringing souls into harmony with God or absolute reality. Social justict, not as an end in itself, but as means toward the end of glorifying God, and enjoying Him, can be achieved only as a by-product of the achievement of the spiritual purpose that reaches so far beyond it.

Western Accessories

That brings me to the question, "What must we Western Christians do on our side in order to meet our brothers, the followers of the other higher religions, on the common ground between them and us?" It is profitable for us to discuss the action we should take and the spirit in which we should meet the others. I would suggest first that we in the West should try to

purge our Christianity of its western accessories. In that we have an admirable example set for us by the western Christian missionaries of the earliest wave of western missionary work in modern times, the Jesuit missionaries in China and India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Jesuits were highly cultivated men possessing all the resources of western Christendom which by that time was a highly cultivated civilization. When they came upon the civilizations of China and India, they were able to realize that here they were in the presence of great cultures, which on the secular side were built upon different foundations and different philosophies. These Jesuit missionaries realized that the Greek terms, in which Christianity had been expressed from the time of the Roman Empire, were not the terms in which to make it accessible to the hearts of Chinese and Indians. And they deliberately therefore tried to divest their Christianity of its western and its Greco-Roman accessories and to put it to the Chinese and the Indians in their own terms.

We are always relapsing from the worship of God into the worship of our tribe or of ourselves. We Christians tend, whether we are western Christians or eastern Christians, to treat Christianity as if it were the tribal religion of our particular civilization. In the West, we tend to treat it as something that is inseparable from the West, and even as something that derives its virtue not from being Christian but from being western. Christianity has always been a gospel not just for the West but for the whole human race, and there have always been non-western Christian churches. If we approach the followers of non-western Christianity and of the non-Christian higher religions as Christians simply, and not as Christian westerners, we shall be much more likely to open their hearts and minds to Christianity.

The Sin of Exclusiveness

Then I come to a second point, a suggestion for what we should try to do, which is crucial and in proportion controversial. I would say that we should also try to purge our Christianity of the traditional Christian belief that Christianity is unique. I would suggest that we have to do this if we are to purge our Christianity of the exclusive-mindedness and intolerance that follows from belief in Christianity's uniqueness. And

here I would like to draw a distinction which I think is all important, though also no doubt debatable. I would say that one can have a conviction about the essential truth and rightness and value of the fundamental points, and at the same time not believe that I, my church, my people, have the sole and unique revelation.

If one accepts and acts on the Jewish and Christian version of God as being love, one would feel it most unlikely of course that I and my church and my people had not had some revelation from God. If He loves mankind, He would have made a revelation to us. But on the same ground, and in the same virtue of the vision of what God's nature is, it seems also most unlikely that He would not have made other revelations to other peoples. And it seems unlikely that He would not have given revelation in different forms, different facets, different degrees, according to the difference in the nature of individual souls and in the nature of the local traditions of civilizations. So I would say that this view is essentially a corollary of the Christian view of God as being love. But to purge Christianity of its exclusive-mindedness is a much harder task, a much harder spiritual task, than to purge it of its western accretions. The vein of exclusiveness and intolerance in Christianity is not, I would say, an especially western deformation of Christianity. It is a congenital feature which is part of Christianity and also of Islam's heritage from Judaism. Just as the vision of God as love is a heritage from Judaism, so is the other vision of God as a jealous God, the God of my tribe as against the Gentiles outside my tribe, or, my church, my people, my community, whatever the case may be.

However hard it may be to purge of its exclusive-mindedness, it seems imperative for Christians to achieve this spiritual feat. The paramount reason I would say is that exclusive-mindedness is a sinful state of mind. It is the sin of pride, and the sin of pride becomes mortally dangerous when it is translated from the singular into the plural. We increase its danger because it is easier for us to believe we are not committing it. As an expression of self-centeredness, it is purely incompatible with the Christian intuition that God is not self-centered, but just the opposite, self-sacrificing. If God is self-sacrificing, as we believe Him to be, then it follows that we human beings should do our best to break out of self-centeredness in the plural as well as in the singular. That would be the only way of putting ourselves

into harmony with the God who is not self-centered, but self-sacrificing.

Then the historian looking at the present scene, with his eyes looking over his shoulder into the past, would say that in the past this arrogant, intolerant vein in Christianity has in fact led, and you might say rightly led, to the rejection of Christianity. Now I think that if Christians fail to purge Christian arrogance out of Christianity now, it will lead to the rejection of Christianity in the future. I think if it is presented to people in that traditional arrogant spirit, it will be rejected in the name of the sacredness of human personality to which the whole human race is now awakening. In truth, I would say that Christian arrogance is un-Christian and anti-Christian, and here we seem to be confronted once again with the unresolved conflicts inherited by Christianity and Islam from Judaism between two visions of the nature of God, two visions which I would believe are mutually incompatible.

Respect for Other Faiths

What then should be the attitude of contrite Christians toward the other high religions and their followers? I think it is possible for us, while holding that our convictions are true and right, to recognize that all the higher religions are, in some measure and in some facet of the truth, also revelations of what is true and right. They also come from God. They may and do differ in the contents and degree of the revelation that has been given to mankind through them. They may also differ in the extent to which this revelation has been translated by their followers into practice, both individual practice and social practice. But we should recognize that they too are light from the same source from which our own religion derives its spiritual light since that must be so if God is the God of all men and is also love.

We should face another point. The great difficulty is that one's relation to the religion in which one has been brought up is so much more intimate than one's relation to other religions which one has learned to know later in life, and therefore to some extent from outside. So that in comparing one's own family religion or ancestral religion with other religions, one is in a

sense comparing two things to which one's emotional relation is different. Therefore, it is difficult to make an objective judgment between them. Nevertheless, I think we can foresee that if the world continues to grow together into a single family, one human family, objective judgments between different living religions will become in the course of time rather less difficult to make, as the unification of the world proceeds.

I think one form that this unification will take will be a unification of our different cultural heritages. I think one could foresee a time in which, for instance, the heritage of Islam and of Buddhism would become parts of our Christian society's background. In our time already we have seen how the Christian heritage did become a part of the background of a great Hindu saint, the Mahatma Ghandi. On a less exalted plane than Ghandi's, we already see Christians of ordinary spiritual stature making individual choices in grownup life between the Protestant and the Catholic versions of western Christianity and between western and non-western versions of Christianity. On the whole I think we can already see a tendency for people to pass by deliberate choice from one religion to another, as opposed to the traditional state of religious affairs in which one almost automatically remained for life in the religion in which one had been born by the extraordinary accident of birth. I think this tendency toward making a free choice of religion in grownup life is likely to increase as the world grows closer together.

In the light of history, I would not personally expect to see a so-called syncretistic religion, a kind of artificial religion composed artificially from elements of all the other religions, brought into being. At least I would not expect such a religion to capture the imagination, the feelings, and the allegiance of mankind. I would not expect it because such attempts are generally made only partly for religious reasons, and partly for utilitarian reasons which are other than religious. I would not say that I expect to see a coalescence of the historic religions, but I think it may be expected and also may be hoped that all religions while retaining their historic identities will become more and more open-minded, and what is more important, openhearted toward one another, as the world's different cultural and spiritual heritages become increasingly the common possession of all mankind.

I would say that in learning more and more to respect, rev-

erence, admire, and love other faiths, we should be making progress in the true practice of Christianity. Practicing of the Christian virtue of charity need not prevent us from holding fast to what we believe to be the essential truths and ideals in our own Christian faith.

The Continuing Witness to Christianity

Here we come to a point of capital importance and no doubt a most disputed point. I think we can and should continue to preach these truths and ideals to the non-Christian majority of our fellow human beings. If at the same time we can be receptive to the truths and ideals of the other faiths, we shall be much more likely to win the attention and good will of the followers of the other faiths. If we can learn to expound and present Christianity in this spirit, we can perhaps present it with conviction, without at the same time relapsing into Christianity's traditional sin of arrogance and intolerance.

I have used the words "the essential elements" in Christianity, and that really compels me to say what I would myself say to be the essential elements in our own religion, Christianity. I would bring up with great diffidence three points as being essential. The first point I would make is that Christianity is a vision of God as so loving his creatures that He has sacrificed Himself for their salvation. The second essential point would be a conviction that human beings ought to follow the example that God has set them in His incarnation and crucifixion. The third point is not just to hold this conviction theoretically, but to act on it as far as one is able.

I would say that these three points are essential in Christianity, but I would not say that they are exclusively Christian. I think as found in Christianity they have non-Christian precedents and also living non-Christian parallels. I would say that in northern Buddhism, for example, we do have quite independently of Christianity, the version of a self-sacrificing, I cannot call it a god, but a supreme being, a being who has reached the highest point which sentient creatures are capable.

If we sincerely believe in the truth of our own religion and in the goodness of its ideals and in the sense of obligation that we have to put these ideals into practice, I think we need not be afraid of competition between Christianity and the other living

higher religions in our new world-wide society. I think we can be fairly sure that the Buddhist and the Hindus will, on the whole, conduct it in peace and charity. It is perhaps not they, but we Moslems and Christians and Jews who will be called upon to make the greater effort, to overcome our traditional intolerance. We have precedents in our own living historical past which I think are encouraging for that.

Conviction Without Fanaticism

In entering into a charitable competition with another group of sister religions, the other living higher religions of the contemporary world, Christians today I think can feel sure in advance of two things. In a peaceful competition, the best of the competing religions will eventually win the allegiance of the whole human race. If we believe that God is love, we will believe that the whole human race will eventually turn to the vision of Him which is the fullest vision and which gives the fullest means of grace. We can also believe that the winning religion, whichever it may be, will not eliminate the other religions that it replaces; even if it replaces them, it will do that by absorbing into itself what is best in them. In winning the competition between the higher religions in the Roman Empire, I think Christianity did not really eliminate Isis worship or Sibyl worship. I think one of the means by which it won, and one of the conditions on which it won, was that it did absorb what was valuable in them into itself.

I believe that Christians today can face the future with confidence if they face it with charity and humility. The crucial point I would wish to make is that we can have conviction without fanaticism, we can have belief and action without arrogance and self-centeredness and pride. At the end of the struggle in the Roman Empire between the victorious Christian church and the pre-Christian paganism, you'll remember there was an incident in time when the Christian Roman government was forcefully closing the pagan temples and suppressing pagan forms of worship. The government ordered the removal from the senate house at Rome of the statues and altar of victory which had been put there by Julius Caesar. The spokesman of the senate at the time, Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, had a

conference with St. Ambrose on the subject, and the documents have survived. Symmachus was beaten not in argument but by governmental force. But in one of his last statements he says, "It is impossible that so great a mystery should be approached by one road only." Now I would say that Christianity has never answered that point of Symmachus', because to suppress a rival religion and a rival cult is not an answer. That question is still alive in the world today. I think we shall have to face it in our time.

The Christian Approach to the Religions Of The East

Arthur Jeffery

The Christian approach to other religions would probably present no problem but for the fact that Christianity still is, as it has been from the beginning, a missionary religion. There is a sense, of course, in which all religions are missionary religions, for one can hardly suppose that even Confucianism, whose adherents today strenuously deny that their religion either seeks or wants converts from other faiths, could have spread as it did in the Far East save by some preaching the message and others hearing and accepting it. Nevertheless it is historically true that some religions are, and always have been, conscious of and actively engaged in what they conceive as their mission to convert all peoples to their way life. Other religions which once were active missionary religions have ceased such activities, and yet others profess complete lack of interest in increasing their numbers or their influence by attracting converts. Both Islam and Christianity have throughout their history been missionary religions, and thus have always been face to face with the problem of their attitude towards the adherents of other faiths. The famous Islamic doctrine of *Jihad* grows out of this problem of Islam's relations to other religions, and for Islam as for Christianity it is a current problem, since Muslim missionaries, just as Christian missionaries, are today being sent out into various parts of the world to spread the faith. Religions such as Mithraism, which once was being powerfully propagated in the Mediterranean basin, and Manichaism, the history of whose mission effort both in the East and the West has an interest that at times rivals even that of Christianity, are now both dead, but the study of how they approached people of other faiths in their day is often illuminating. Buddhism was for cen-

turies spread by the labors of preachers and ascetics throughout Asia, but presently, as though content with its conquests, has seemingly lost any desire to win further conquests. Likewise Judaism, though at times in its history it has been eager to make proselytes, has for long ceased to manifest any such eagerness, and so faces no problem of missionary approach to those of other faiths. Other religions, such as Hinduism, though they must have spread in earlier days by presentation to and acceptance by peoples of other religious affiliations, have never been missionary religions in the accepted sense.

It is a curious fact, however, that in the eschatology of almost all the great religions of the East, even of so narrowly exclusive a religion as Zoroastrianism, there is a teaching that in the Last Days there will be a great "Conversion of the Gentiles", so that at the Great Consummation all mankind who survive will be members of the true faith. Some among us may perhaps take it as a sign of the approaching end of the age that in our modern world, as part of a curious awakening of the religions of the East, there is among them a growing sense of mission, one result of which is an increasing number of organizations busy with programs for converting the Western world to Hinduism, or Buddhism, or Jainism, as the case may be. Even a casual visitor to California, for instance, can hardly fail to notice the number of Oriental cults competing there for the attention of the Christian public.

In part this has developed as a reaction to the success of Christian missions in Asia, a fact which is demonstrable in the case of the Swami Vivekananda Missions and the Buddhist Mission to London, and which also comes out very clearly in the labors of such writers as Radhakrishnan and Muhammad Iqbal in India, or Suzuki in Japan, to reinterpret Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism in terms which will appeal to the West. The very names of such institutions as the Buddhist Sunday School Union, the Young Mens' Muslim Association, the Young Womens' Hebrew Association, the Jaina Endeavour Society, the Prarthana Depressed Classes Mission Society, the Neo-Buddhist Hymn-Book, speak for themselves. The first hymn in this latter production runs:

> All hail the power of Buddha's name,
> Let angels prostrate fall.
> Bring forth the royal diadem,
> And crown Him Lord of all.

and the second hymn is like unto it:

> Buddha, the very thought of Thee,
> With sweetness fills my breast;
> But sweeter far Thy face to see,
> And in Thy presence rest.

The Mazdaznan Association, which built a "temple" at Boston, issued a prayer which it called "Ahura's Prayer of Assurance", and which reads:

> Ahura, our Father, who art in peace,
> Intoned be Thy name;
> Thy realm arise;
> Thy will incarnate upon the earth as in heaven.
> This day impart Thy word,
> And remember not our offenses
> That we may forgive those who offend us.
> Through temptations guide us,
> And from error deliver us.
> Be it so.

Comment is unnecessary.

In part, however, this new sense of mission derives from that emergent nationalism which, all over Asia, is a reaction, brought about in great part by Western education, against Western supremacy, and fostered by a pride that greatly desires to see an Oriental supremacy. There is nothing strange in this. The same thing appeared in the ancient Near East as a reaction to the spread of Hellenism in the wake of Alexander's conquests. It is natural, but it is there. A very gentle, soft-spoken Jain who passed through Cairo only two years ago, stated quite plainly that in India they were looking forward to the day when the East would show itself so superior to the West, that Europeans and Americans would become converts to Eastern religions rather than Orientals being converted to Christianity.

Christian Misgivings

Now along with this there is coming from within Western society, and to some extent from within the professedly Christian community, a questioning as to whether our Christian concern with the historic mission of the Church is not a mistake. At gatherings of Western Orientalists, one may hear missionaries held up to scorn for having been so misguided as to try to convert Hindus. A student at a neighboring institution who applied for a travel grant to enable him to complete a particular piece of research, was bluntly told that it was an impertinence

for a Christian to write a critical study on Islam. At a dinner in a big hotel in this city, a lady speaker expressed in no uncertain language her opinion of the bigotry of those Christians who thought they had so much light they could go about dispelling the darkness in which people of other faiths lived. Even in this Seminary, a student in answering an examination paper, gave it as his opinion that it was an unpardonable offense against personality to attempt to change another person's religious convictions.

This is all the more curious when one notices that it is considered very wrong to ridicule the Swamis of the Ramakrishna Mission who come to this country to convert Christians to Hinduism, that no one considers it an impertinence for a Jew to write critically of Christianity, nor objects to the Bahais building their sumptuous temple from which they plan to spread light to dispel our Christian darkness. Also, it is not at all clear why it should be such an offense to personality to try to change a person's religious convictions when it is recognized as perfectly legitimate to labor with great earnestness to change men's political convictions. A very good friend of ours strongly defends the right of Communists to establish cells in the Colleges, on the ground that if they believe they have a socio-political theory which is for the ultimate good of humanity they have every right to freedom in propagating their belief. Their way *could* be the right way, and if they can persuade others that it *is* the right way it is wrong for us to hinder them. Yet, that same friend is extremely nervous about Christian propaganda on the campus. One finds it hard to see why it should be right and proper for Communists to persuade others that their way is right, but wrong for Christians to urge their way.

At times there seems more than a suspicion of perversity in this. Some years ago the C.M.S. missionaries in the Sudan were much concerned at the way in which certain British officials were putting hindrances in the way of their work among the pagan tribes, yet those same officials favored the conversion of the pagan tribes to Islam. If it was felt by officialdom that there was no offense to the personalities of these peoples in their being persuaded to give up their traditional pagan way of life for that of Islam, just why should there be such an offense in their being persuaded to accept the Christian Gospel and the Christian way of life?

This comparison with Islam may be pressed further. Not so

long ago many of us listened here to an after-dinner speech by a prominent clergyman who had returned from a visit to India, in which current practices in Christian churches he had visited in India were held up for our reprobation. The achitecture of such churches, he found, was Western and not patterned on truly indigenous Indian models. Also the music he heard in them was Western, and not the beautiful Indian music he heard elsewhere. In one church they even used the Anglican liturgy and said a prayer for the British monarch. The church festivals he found them celebrating were of Western origin rather than what had grown up in the Christian community there out of Indian soil. All this was obviously considered to be most reprehensible, and an example of our poor approach to the Indian mind.

Islam in India

But let us look for a moment at another picture from India, the India in which those Christian churches he visited had been founded and had grown up. In that India there were some ninety million Muslims, 85% of whom were descendants of converts to Islam, i.e. were indigenous Indians, not Arabs or Persians or Turks from abroad. Every Friday they went to mosque, and every mosque in India is built on the pattern of the Prophet's mosque in Madina, and though its elaboration and its decoration may in some respects be influenced by local usage, that ornamentation must strictly conform to the regulations laid down in Qur'an and Tradition. The architectural wonders so much admired by tourists in India, the Jami' Masjid and the Taj Mahal at Agra, the mosques at Ajmir and Fathepur Sikri, the Koutub and the tomb of Altamsh at Delhi, the mausoleum of Humayun, are as little indigenous to India as that Anglican Church aforementioned. Likewise the music they find so entrancing is not indigenous. Those who have expert knowledge in such matters tell us that the only indigenous music still left in India is the folk-music of the aboriginal tribes. What we regard as characteristically Indian music is something introduced by the Muslims during the Moghul period, and the very scale used in its compositions is one if not invented yet made popular by a famous musician of Baghdad. Each day the religiously minded among those ninety million Muslims bowed five times in pray-

er, facing as they bowed the non-Indian city of Mecca, and saying their prayers in Arabic, a language no more indigenous to India than English. Moreover the ritual of their prayer, in its every genuflection, is one that was established in Arabia in the seventh century, and the festivals they annually observed were Islamic festivals originally concerned with events that had happened in lands very far away from India, and for hundreds of years, at each Friday mosque service, they said a prayer for the Caliph in Constantinople.

If these things are not reprehensible in the case of Islam, why should they be so in the case of Christianity? Indeed, Indian culture has been greatly enriched by Muslim importations. Who would want to see India impoverished by the removal of all the architectural glories brought in by Islam, or Indian music again reduced to the few poor indigenous modes? Some years ago there was considerable discussion of a project to Indianize the religious vocabulary used in Christian writing in the vernaculars. Since the days of the early missionaries, Christian religious terminology that was non-Indian had been used, and the project was to find in the ancient Sanskrit texts genuine old Indian words which might be used instead. This sounds well, but is it wise? During the years of Islam's penetration into India hundreds of Arabic and Persian words have entered the various vernaculars and are used by the people with as little consciousness that they are of foreign origin as we are normally conscious that our musical vocabulary—piano, contralto, solo, cantata, etc. —is of Italian origin. These borrowings from Arabic and Persian have enriched the vernaculars just as Greek technical religious words, bishop, deacon, archangel, eucharist, presbyter, dogma, baptize, evangelize, etc. have enriched our own language. If we feel no sense of inferiority in having to use Greek words instead of Anglo-Saxon words in our religious writing, and if Indians themselves are conscious of no inferiority because of the use of Arabic and Persian words they have absorbed, why should there be so much concern to find old Sanskrit words instead of letting the vernaculars have the enrichment of Christian vocabulary from the West? As a matter of fact the Sanskrit words are not really indigenous, for they were brought into India by the Aryan speaking invaders. The pre-Aryan languages of the Dravidian and Munda groups were enriched in those early days by taking over hundreds of religious and culture words from the Sanskrit, so that it is really a little absurd for modern vernacu-

lars such as Bengali to labor at a "purification" by the excision of Arabo-Persian and Western elements in their vocabulary.

Charges Against Christians

All this suggests that we should perhaps reconsider the charge that our Christian attitude towards the religions of the East has been and is now a mistaken one. The charges we currently hear are four.

(1) It is charged that our approach is egotistical, since we come to these Eastern peoples with the claim that we alone have the truth, that ours is the only true revelation. The charge, of course, is not strictly true. Since the days of the first disciples, Christianity has been teaching with John of the "light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" and with Paul that even among the heathen God "hath not left Himself without witness." One may occasionally find Christian advocates who see nothing in other religions but the deceits of the devil, but that attitude is not characteristic. The deceits of the devil are there, but they are not all that is there. What we claim is that we have something better. Is it necessarily egotistical to make that claim? If we come across a man struggling to solve his construction problems armed with arithmetic as his only mathematical technique, is it being egotistical if we offer to teach him some algebra and trigonometry, and even a little calculus, which will immensely enrich his techniques for dealing with his problems, and not only ease but make more accurate his solutions? We know this is true because it has been our own experience. We are not condemning his arithmetic as wrong and valueless. We ourselves recognize and use all the truth and all the values it has, but we know that it is inadequate when we come to deal with the intricacies of modern construction problems, and we know we have something that comes near to perfection that we can offer. Doubtless it is possible to offer it in an egotistical way, maybe in a manner that is offensive, but is the offering of it necessarily egotistical? Then why should it be so in the case of religion? Religion, from one point of view, is also a technique for attaining a richer, fuller, more abundant life, and if from our experience we are aware that we have something in our revelation, in our religious life, that is better, and something that we would gladly share, surely the offer to share need not involve any egotistical approach.

(2) It is charged that our approach is arrogant. Just after World War I a British military officer in South India, who was known for his interest in various movements for social reform, refused to serve on a committee organized by a missionary body, not because he was opposed to the committee's project, but because he did not want his name associated with the arrogant presumption of the Christian approach to India's age old culture. There are many like-minded persons, whose attitude is that it is inexcusable presumption to preach the Christian Gospel to these peoples of the East whose culture had grappled with and reached solutions to the great problems of life thousands of years before Christianity was born. Again one wonders why? Islam is a religion of even more recent origin than Christianity, yet no charge of arrogant presumption is ever raised against the preaching of Islam to these peoples. On the contrary one hears the Muslims lauded for their brave proclamation of monotheism against polytheisms, for their iconoclastic approach to idolatry. In what is Christianity more presumptuous than Islam?

Moreover, is it presumption? These Oriental cultures had also grasped with such important problems as lighting and transportation, and had reached solutions a very long time ago, solutions, moreover, which had come to fit admirably into their way of life. Is it then presumptuous of us to introduce them to electricity as a substitute for wicks of flax floating in vessels of oil, to introduce motor-cars in place of camels, and modern mechanical means of transport to replace coolie labor? The introduction of these things must inevitably result in serious changes in the socio-economic structure of Oriental life, but no one would for that reason regard their introduction as arrogant presumption in the face of age old Eastern culture. In fact, Orientals themselves are demanding a share in our technological advances. Then why should the presentation of religious advances, or at least what seem to us to be advances, be regarded as arrogantly presumptuous?

The Charge of Intolerance

(3) It is charged that we are insensitive to and ignorantly intolerant of values other than our own. This strikes a personal chord. My undergraduate years at the University were during a period of enthusiasm for "Light from the East". This was

being fed to us through many channels. Our Ancient History people were never tired of reminding us that ours was only a little "pip-squeak" civilization compared with the ancient civilizations that had flourished in the Orient. We had on the campus an ardent advocate of the wisdom of the "old one" Lao Tzu, beside which, we were told, all our Western wisdom showed but pale. The wife of our Professor of Philosophy encouraged little circles to study the poems of Tagore. Mrs. Annie Besant visited us during her trip to stir up the local Theosophists, and she had discoursed to student audiences on the Mahatmas, Arhats, Bodhisattvas who ages before Christ had penetrated to ultimate truth on all these religious problems, and whose teaching could still be learned in India from the *sadhus* and *sannyasis* of that favored land. In my own College, a little group met spasmodically to meditate on Sir Edwin Arnold's *Light of Asia* and *Song Celestial*. All this enthusiasm was not dampened by the appearance of an English translation of Adolf Deissmann's *Licht vom Osten*. So when I left for India in World War I, my mind was well attuned to the conviction that we must humbly and gratefully expect much illumination from the profound, immemorial wisdom enshrined in the religions of the East. My first Indian temple came as an awful shock. That malodorous building with its obscene idols, those vile priests, and the poor little temple prostitutes—"brides of the god"—did not seem to promise much "Light from the East". The first *sadhu* I encountered was having the hell beaten out of him by an English policeman who had caught him in the bazaar committing sodomy on two small boys. The holy man had pleaded that he was only imparting to them instruction by that route, but the policeman, apparently insensitive to and intolerant of such values, did not believe him. On the wall of the High Court building just opposite to where we lived sat a naked *sannyasis*, apparently as much a fixture as the railings. Dr. Sherriff, our Natural Science man, was intrigued and got a Tamil-speaking student to question him, hoping for some pearls of wisdom, but after several tries the boy exclaimed: "Sir, he understands nothing. He has no mind. He is a vegetable." So even an Indian student failed to find the values.

Indeed, today great numbers of Indians are ashamed of gross idolatry, of certain aspects of temple worship, of caste restrictions, of child marriage, and of many other things about which the Christian missionaries were intolerant. Equally as many Muslims are ashamed of polygamy and concubinage, of the ha-

rem institution and slavery, of Holy War, and go to elaborate lengths to explain away those things in Muhammad's life which the missionaries had found objectionable. One may thus question whether Christian objection to such things arose from inability to appreciate values.

On the other side stands the record of missionary labors towards preserving and interpreting the cultures of the Orient. To take only the field of my own professional concern, a whole number of this *Review* could be taken up with merely listing the work of missionaries in preparing Grammars, compiling Lexicons, editing and translating texts, recording monuments, interpreting the literature, the history, the religion and the customs of Oriental peoples. Was it not a missionary who initiated the *Heritage of India* Series? This hardly looks like insensitiveness to and ignorant intolerance of values other than our own.

The Charge of Destructiveness

(4) It is charged that our approach is destructive and not constructive. This presents a quite peculiar problem. It seems almost a law of nature that the coming of the new means the destruction of the old. Nowadays one rarely sees a camel along the route from Damascus to Baghdad, for the coming of the Nairne Transport Company with its motor vehicles meant the death of the camel transport. The installation of a telephone system in Cairo put an end to the old messenger service that had been constant since Pharaonic days. These things are inevitable. One kindly soul did agitate in the Damascus papers that as Mr. Petrillo of the Musicians' Union was reported able to force houses of entertainment to hire unwanted musicians to the number eliminated by mechanical devices, so the Nairne Company be forced to hire so many camels for each bus it put into service, but nothing came of it and the camels have gone. Would anyone really wish the old system to return? The Graeco-Roman paganism of the first centuries was destroyed. Julian, with his like-minded friends, labored earnestly to restore it, but there was no popular enthusiasm for its restoration, so it passed away, and no one would wish it back again. The Jewish sacrificial system was destroyed. All the detailed regulations concerning it are still in the Torah, devoutly read and reverently studied, but even should the Jews in our generation once again possess

the Temple area in Jerusalem, it may be doubted whether even the most ardent Zionists would seek to restore the system of daily sacrifices.

Christianity destroyed the practice of widow-burning in India, but has failed to do anything constructive about the problem of unwanted widows, a problem which was certainly cared for by the old custom. Christianity destroyed the quaint Melanesian custom of killing and eating one's parents and relatives when they got so old as to become a burden on the community, but Christianity has done nothing constructive to solve the problem of increasing numbers of old people who are consumers but non-producers. Yet would anyone advocate the reintroduction of widow burning, or the revival, and maybe extension as a contribution to geriatrics, of the custom of eating one's parents and kinsfolk when they reach the age of sixty-five? It would be easy to multiply examples of such problems, and though it is not exclusively a Christian problem we must plead guilty to having given too little thought to what could be done constructively after there has been destruction.

Nevertheless it is not true to charge that Christianity has done nothing to replace what it has destroyed. Where it has destroyed the orgiastic fertility cult of the Mother Goddess it has offered instead a loving Heavenly Father. Where it has destroyed polytheistic idol worship it has offered instead the One All-wise, Almighty Creator and Preserver. Where it has destroyed belief in a demon-infested world it has offered a Holy Spirit as Comforter and Guide. Where it has destroyed Mystery religions with their vague intimations of immortality, and their Lords many and Saviours many, it has offered the One Lord and Saviour who brought life and immortality to light. Where it has caused the pagan oracles to cease, it has offered the Word of God. And so one might go on at length. Maybe we have not always been adequately aware of all the problems that may arise from the breaking down of the old and the necessity for adjusting to the new, but it is not true to charge that Christianity has wantonly destroyed the religious faith of men without offering them an adequate replacement. The way in which Eastern religions, in their desire to be again missionary religions, imitate Christian missionary practices is itself eloquent witness to the constructive side of Christianity's approach to other faiths.

There is much discussion just now of the new alignment of Christian Missions in view of the very changed situation in many countries to which missionaries have been and are being sent. This question of the Christian approach to other faiths might well be integrated into such discussions. Doubtless we have very much to learn, many mistakes to correct, and new avenues to explore, but it may be doubted whether in fundamentals we can, or should if we could, depart from the way of approach which was initiated by the Apostles and has been on the whole very faithfully maintained through the centuries by those who have followed them.

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The Christian Life and an Economy of Abundance

Reinhold Niebuhr

And he said to them, "Take heed, and beware of all covetousness; for a man's life does not consist in the abundance of his possessions." (Luke 12:15)

Have you ever felt embarrassed about these words as I have been, not because we are particularly covetous, but because it challenges the whole of our civilization, seemingly at its core? The embarrassment increases when we include the parable of the Rich Fool who built his big barns, who was told, "Thou Fool, this night will thy life be taken from thee." You can't solve the ultimate problem of human existence by abundance. If you consider the whole Sermon on the Mount, perhaps the embarrassment changes a little from embarrassment about yourself to embarrassment about the Christian faith: "Be not anxious for your life"; "consider the lilies of the field, they toil not, neither do they spin, yet Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these." The prohibition of anxiety is so valid and yet it seems to be informed by such romantic nonchalance which defies every canon of a technical civilization. Civilization was born, as it were, with the anxiety about the wintry tomorrow which prompted the canning industry. In other words, what we face is the embarrassment that a Christian civilization should also be the most technical civilization in the whole world.

We are so technical, not because we simply defied the words of the text and became materialistic and covetous. Nor are we technical by accident. A technical civilization is the fruit of the biblical faith, of its attitude toward life, the life in this body on the one hand, of the affirmation of the goodness of life in

this body, as symbolized in the petition, "Give us this day our daily bread." That means bread, and not allegorical bread as the mystic Gerald Heard suggests. That's bread that you bite with your teeth, and digest in your stomach. The other dimension to the Christian faith is given in the words: "Man does not live by bread alone."

The second basis of a technical civilization is the Biblical attitude toward nature. Nature is not divine; you can thrust impious hands into nature, and make her bring forth her secrets. That is the basis of all modern science. The Greeks taught us that nature is rational, hence, the relationship between mathematics and physics. The fact that nature is rational is the basis of all deductive science. But the Bible taught us, in its doctrine of creation, that nature is not quite rational and this is the basis of all empirical science. You must be humble before the fact and not trust too much in deduction. Induction and deduction were joined in modern science and we conquered nature. That is how a Christian culture became a technical one.

There is a basic embarrassment we face in the so-called economy of abundance as Christians. The embarrassment has been heightened in America because of all the technical nations, we have the most abundance. Our living standards are three to five times higher than the European living standards and five to ten times higher than the Asian or African standards. We have multiplied the productivity per man by three times in this half century, since 1900. We've multiplied our gross products five times. We are sitting in plenty. There was a dream in the 19th century that there would be an economy of abundance sometime. The Marxists dreamed of establishing it. One of the ironic facts is that the godless materialists didn't establish it, and the so-called godly materialists were very successful in establishing it, but not because we were godly and they were ungodly. So successful have we been in America, that we are both the subject of the envy and the contempt of the world—and you never quite know whether it's envy or contempt—and that creates the anti-American sentiment in Asia and in Europe.

Before I speak about the two moral and the two religious answers, or facets of answers to the problem, let us deal briefly with false answers that have been given to it. One of the false answers is: since techniques have developed not only the atomic bomb, but also all this materialism and covetousness, why don't

we declare a moratorium on techniques? An Anglican theologian made that suggestion, and the Pope rather hesitantly made the same suggestion when the atomic bomb was first invented. He didn't follow it up, he wasn't quite sure of himself about this, but he suggested that there should be a moratorium on techniques.

This is a false answer, for one reason because it is not possible, and for another reason because it isn't feasible. It is not possible because technical advances are like forces of nature. They operate through the minds of men, but they do not operate by the wills of men. Where is the dictator who could declare a moratorium even in one nation, not to speak of all the Western nations, and say, "Let's stop this." Also, since technical power is morally ambiguous and can create good as well as evil, it is therefore not feasible to stop it. At the Amsterdam Conference the continental European delegates agonized about the unChristian character of techniques and how one must get rid of them. A distinguished Indian, Mr. Manikam, arose and pricked this bubble. He said, "you may have qualms of conscience about techniques, but before you get rid of them would you let them last just long enough so that we could eliminate our poverty?" It is a false answer to declare a moratorium on techniques.

The second partly false answer is to solve this problem of technical abundance by ascetic discipline. We must be poor. We must make ourselves poor. How are we going to make ourselves poor in a rich civilization? I notice that I, and the other members of the Union faculty, live in rather ostentatiously comfortable apartments, that is, they are not really ostentatious, but compared with the standards of the man who said, "the birds of the heaven have their nests, and the foxes have holes, and the Son of Man hath nowhere to lay his head," they are. If you want to go back to that standard you have to practice the strictest ascetic glorification of poverty. Is poverty really the source of virtue, or the guarantee of virtue? Fortunately we have in the Scripture, in the Matthian and Lukan passages, this wonderful expression of the ambiguity of poverty—"Blessed are the poor", said St. Luke; "Blessed are the poor in spirit", said St. Matthew, and one guesses that our Lord said something that meant both of these. There's no question about "how hardly they that are rich will enter the kingdom of heaven", but there is also no question that there is no guarantee of virtue in pover-

ty. "Blessed are the poor", but "blessed are the poor in spirit". And they are particularly blessed if they are poor in spirit though they might be rich. These are the facts which prevent us from following a strict ascetic answer to these ultimate questions. Incidentally, no complicated system of legalism would give us an answer to just how poor or rich we should be. The American housewife, for instance, has many more gadgets than any housewife in the world, but she also has fewer servants than any Western housewife. The gadgets have been built into our whole civilization. I believe thoroughly that we must avoid ostentation, but how are we going to avoid ostentation collectively even if we avoid it individually, because collectively we are ostentatious from the standpoint of Europe or Asia. An English friend who came annually to the United Nations, said some years ago, "I don't like America any more—your cars are getting bigger and bigger and the chrome is getting shinier and shinier." He said that before our cars broke forth in all these Easter egg colors of the present time. We ought to have a decent sense of the esthetic and the ethical problem of life in an abundant civilization, but we do not solve our problem by any kind of an ascetic discipline. Individuals may, but civilization does not.

Dismissing the false answers and the half-false answers, let us confront the moral and religious questions, which we face in an economy of abundance, particularly in America. The first moral problem is of course to establish justice. The more we have in the common fund, the more intolerable injustice becomes, that is the failure to divide the common fund equitably. I don't think we ought to be complacent about establishing justice. Wherever there is a great disproportion of power and weakness, (and there are still disproportions of power and weakness in our country), there is injustice. But it certainly must be observed that, contrary to all the expectations, the economy of abundance has on the whole made for justice. When there are not clamant claims and counterclaims on the common fund, you can distribute it with relative equity. So in addition to our millionaires, we are also a nation where teamsters get a much larger salary than university pofessors. (That may be justice too, I merely say "may" because I am not sure, as a professor, that this is so.) This indicates, at any rate, that we have had a tremendous social revolution based upon an economy of abundance. So what seemed to be such a desperate task, only twenty years ago, and what still is a difficult task, is now a manageable

one. We have to put it in the first place, not because it is the most serious, but because in a way it is the easiest to establish justice domestically.

The second great moral problem which transcends all ascetic disciplines is how this nation with its tremendous power, (power which is based upon technical proficiency rather than wisdom), how is this nation going to relate itself mutually and generously and justly to the poor world? Everything that we do about that will be insufficient. There is a snare to our cconscience in every policy because we will imagine ourselves generous and the recipients of our generosity will be more critical than we are, partly because we will not be as generous as we imagine we are, and partly because our motives are more mixed than we realize they are. This is one of the great causes of misunderstanding between this rich America and the poor world. So serious is the misunderstanding that every kind of an imagination and patience will be necessary on the part of both the rich and the poor to establish any degree of mutuality at all. I see this in the present week when there is a danger that we will cut down our aid program to foreign nations in order to balance the budget. What could be more important for a rich nation than to balance the budget? These are the two moral problems: to establish justice at home, and to establish a degree of mutuality with ourselves and the world since God in His providence has given us this very dangerous leadership of the community of free nations.

But when I speak of these political and moral issues, I am still speaking about that which affects us as collective man, as Americans if you will, or as Europeans, or as devotees and beneficiaries of Western civilization.

Let us come now to the two great religious issues which we confront in an economy of abundance. The first is quite obviously that we should have a decent understanding of the providential factors which entered into our wealth, so that we will not arrogantly regard it as we are constantly tempted to do, as a fruit and as a proof of our virtue, the virtue of diligence for example. When it comes to proficiency, the northern west Europeans, the Germans, the Swiss, the Scandinavians, the Dutch are just as efficient as we are, and perhaps more diligent because they are poorer, but they haven't been favored either by nature or history as we have been favored. There must be an

understanding of the providential factors which enter into our wealth, or we will become the arrogant people on earth and here the word of Deuteronomy to Israel is absolutely pat for our situation—"And when thou hast eaten and art satisfied and thy gold and silver are multiplied and thy cattle and thy flocks are multiplied . . . beware lest thou forget the Lord thy God and say my right hand has gotten me this wealth." This is a text that is particularly relevant to America just before Thanksgiving Day. The Thanksgiving proclamations of the American presidents for the last two decades, have increasingly departed from the original rather purely religious spirit of Thanksgiving, and they have increasingly become congratulations to God for having such very wonderful children in America. The wealth of our continent, the breadth of our economic unit which might be regarded as the fruit of wisdom, but really was possible only because we conquered this continent at the precise moment when a technical civilization made it possible to organize a whole continent as one political and economic unity,—these are all providential factors. I don't know whether you would regard it as providential that we could give ourself to industrial efficiency without any restraint, the restraints that all of the European aristocratic nations have. Perhaps this is a special pleading, but we do not give ourselves so much to the fruits of industrial efficiency in wealth nearly so much as we give ourselves to the idea of efficiency itself, so that we are now in danger of becoming the first great culture of history that is dominated by its economy. We have to live as luxuriously as possible because the automobiles can come out of the assembly line in greater and greater numbers and we have to buy them in order to keep the economy going. This is a fantastic consequence and revelation of the weakness of man despite his greatness.

This brings us to the final point where the Word of God might reach us. A technical civilization is vulgar religiously, not necessarily morally, but religiously, because and in so far as it tries to cover up the human predicament, as illustrated by that parable of the rich young fool. We are so weak and so strong, so strong and so weak, and if we, by technical efficiency try to cover up our weakness, and our finiteness, the fact that we are meant for death, our whole culture will turn into vulgarity for very obvious reasons. This human predicament is well explained by a poet of the 18th century:

Poor man that art the tennis ball of error,
The ship of glass tossed on a sea of terror,
Creeping with pain and crying through the womb,
Going with fear and sighing to the tomb,
How brief thy life, how sure thy fall.
How art thou nothing when thou art most of all.

How art thou nothing when thou art most of all—that's the human predicament. This is the predicament of death which we have messed up with the predicament of sin. Why sin? In our desperate anxiety to prove that we are not weak, finite, subject to frailty we have involved ourselves, as St. Augustine said, "in sin which we could have avoided, in escaping death which we could not have avoided." I don't mean dying, I mean death as a symbol of everything that man is, in spite of his greatness, as merely a creature. This is the central issue which we face as individuals. Can we comprehend the meaning of grace through forgiveness, forgiveness of our sins and the promise of life everlasting in a technical civilization which makes us so many promises in this life? Shakespeare is not usually regarded as an apostle of religious inwardness, but Shakespeare's sonnets all revolve around this theme:

"Poor soul, the center of my sinful earth
Why dost thou pine within and suffer dearth?
Painting thy outward walls so costly gay?
Why so large cost, having so short a lease
Dost thou upon thy fading mansions spend?
Shall worms, inheritors of this excess,
Eat up thy charge? Is this thy body's end?
Then soul, live thou upon thy servant's loss
And let that pine to aggravate thy store;
Buy terms divine in selling hours of dross;
Within be fed, without be rich no more.
So shalt thou feed on Death, which feeds on men,
And Death once dead, there's no more dying then."

This is hardly a doctrine of immortality but it is, I think, a doctrine obliquely related to the Johannine conception of eternal life, challenging us to live a life of serenity amidst the frailties and frustrations of the flesh and of history, and to be wary to regard the abundance of life on one level as the final abundance of life. For the complete dimension of the Christian faith is contained, on the one hand in the petition, "Give us this day our daily bread," and on the other hand, in the observation "man does not live by bread alone."

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The Relation of Theology and Music in Worship

Paul W. Hoon

It may seem strange for a Professor of Pastoral Theology to be invited to lecture to a class in sacred music, but as we think together about worship we may come to understand that music and theology have, or ought to have, much in common. In fact the main thesis of this lecture is that music is only authentically sacred, i.e. appropriate for worship, when it is conceived and rendered as an integral part of the church's ministry of worship, and when accordingly it is set within a theological context. I do not see, really, how we can permit music in worship to be exempt from theological scrutiny any more, let us say, than preaching or prayer. Music inevitably partakes of the same reciprocal relation between doctrine and worship as any other element in a Christian service.

But having said this, I instantly begin to hear familiar rumlings of what a friend of mine once called "the aesthetic complaint", (the musician's equivalent of what in polite language is known as "the gastric complaint"). "Music is art", you will be saying, and you are not sure but that it is art before it is theology or anything else. "Imagine mixing Bach and soteriology, or Palestrina and eschatology! I don't get it". Obviously we will have to define our terms in a moment and deal more precisely with the relation of art and theology in worship; but Bach and soteriology and Palestrina and eschatology may have more in common than we at first suspect, and perhaps we can explore the relation of music and theology in worship in a mutually profitable way.

Our starting point is to understand that worship by its very nature is theological. It inevitably expresses and impresses doctrine, and we must always remember that. In its expressive aspect, worship voices what a believer has already come to believe; it is a believer's declaration of faith, his creed; and the liturgy he follows—including the music—is the vehicle of that theological expression. At the same time, worship begets and

kindles faith. It impresses what men ought to believe in addition to expressing what they do believe. It is didactic as well as dogmatic. Father Florovsky reminds us in this connection that a plausible case can be made for interpreting "orthodoxy"—especially in its original use in the Eastern Church—to mean "right glory" rather than "right opinion". To be orthodox is not so much to believe rightly as to worship rightly, with the implication that if you worship rightly you will come to believe rightly. (It is significant, parenthetically, that in the centuries of imperial persecution it was Christian worship rather than Christian belief that was most directly attacked. The enemies of the church understood that they could strike most effectively at Christian doctrine by striking at its worship.) This is to say, that worship is always united with dogma. It both expresses and impresses faith in a distinctively vital way.

Now the importance of this thesis can hardly be overestimated. It means in essence that for the masses of people worship is probably the single most decisive factor in voicing and kindling and shaping Christian faith, and it means that when worship—including music—is corrupt, faith is corrupted. One needs only look at much Protestant worship today to see this thesis verified. Frequently, for example, a service is conducted primarily to produce a psychological experience rather than to worship God, with the music in large part facilitating the psychological manipulation. Or worship is conceived and conducted as the ". . . celebration of the events of crucial significance in the ongoing life of the community, where the concern of all enriches the meaning of what each is living through." I am not quite sure what that means, but it is hardly Christian worship. Or worship often is a kind of pagan idolatry, the worship of some other god than the God revealed in Jesus Christ, perhaps the tribal god of the American Way of Life, or the "only-God-can-make-a-tree" nature deity of our Emersonian friends. Here, for example, is the text of a Walt Whitman anthem sung in a church in which I recently worshipped; I believe it is worth giving in full:

Out of the cradle endlessly rocking,
Out of the mockingbird's throat,
Out of the Ninthmonth midnight,
Over the sterile sands and the fields beyond, where the child leaving his bed, wandered alone, bareheaded, barefoot,
Down from the showered halo,
Up from the mystic play of shadows twining and twisting as if they were alive,

Out from the patches of briers and blackberries,
Out from the memories of the bird that chanted to me
From your memories, sad brother, from the fitful risings and fallings I hear
From those beginning notes of yearning and love,
From the thousand responses of my heart never to cease.
From such as now they start,
Born hither, I, chanter of pains and joys,
Uniter of here and hereafter,
A reminisence, I sing.

What on earth does that have to do with *Christian* worship? But its equivalent can be found right and left in American Protestantism today.

Theological Affirmations

A fully-articulated theology of worship is obviously beyond the range of this lecture, but there are certain basic theological affirmations I believe we can agree on. First and foremost, Christian worship is theocentric. It is inspired by God, addressed to God, offered to God. The vertical reference is always primary. Now involved here, indirectly at least, are certain aspects of the doctrine of creation and correspondingly of man's creaturehood before God. Because man is a creature he is driven to establish his existence in something other than himself, and in one sense he worships in order to do this. Man is, as we say, a "worshipping animal". The fundamental and inescapable decision of his life is not whether he will worship but who or what he will worship, and the saga of religion is the story of man's effort to find and of his being found by the true God beyond all lesser gods.

The etymology of the word "worship" is relevant here. It is commonly interpreted as derived from "worth-ship", the ascription of supreme worth to God. But Professor Richardson has pointed out that a more thorough etymology derives "worship" from the Old English "weorthan" meaning "to be", signifying that in worship man enters into the ground of his being, he enters into utter dependence on God with whom his very existence and destiny are bound up. Worship, in other words, inevitably has an ontological character, and when it is not conceived theocentrically, when it fails to deal with the fundamental relation of man's self to the true ground of his being, it corrupts man at his core, at the same time that it destroys the only relation that can truly save and secure him, his relation with God.

But the God with whom man enters into relation in worship confronts him in his divine otherness, radically different from any other reality, and the character of man's response is correspondingly unique. Herbert Farmer has a significant phrase here: he writes that in worship the worshipper is possessed by the sense of the sheer "godness of God", and so far from tautology rendering the phrase meaningless, it actually signifies a meaning which any attempt to describe in other words would immediately falsify, for the "otherness," the uniqueness of God, outruns language. Similarly, as I say, man's response of awe, corresponding to God's holiness and otherness is unique, and that is why a German theologian of a generation ago, Rudolph Otto, in writing of worship as an experience of "The Holy", felt impelled to coin certain words and phrases that have entered our theological vocabulary to describe this unique feeling-response, such words as "fascinans", "numinous", "mysterium tremendium", etc.

Yet one cannot say that God is "wholly other", as is the vogue in some theological quarters. For worship requires revelation as well as mystery, immanence as well as transcendence. Indeed the burden of the Biblical message is that God is not merely "Being", a unique "It", but a personal "Thou" who meets the "I" of man's selfhood. Brunner has written: "All doctrine in the Bible means nothing else and points to nothing else than that God addresses us in order that we may answer him in faith," and we may say of worship in particular what Luther says of religion in general, that "the heart of religion lies in its personal pronouns". Actually, Christian worship rests on a paradox, that God is both like and unlike man; he is personal, but he is more than personal. When the former aspect is exaggerated—as in much contemporary worship—God becomes a kind of divine pal, worship becomes chatty intimacy, devoid of reverence and evoking the more infantile elements in human personality. When the latter aspect is exaggerated, worship loses its concreteness and reality, and tends to evaporate into vague states of mystical piety.

Worship further is Christo-centric as well as theocentric; it centers in God as historically revealed and incarnate in Jesus. God's definitive revelation of his personal nature takes place in Jesus, and man most personally encounters God in him. Worship in other words can never be merely theo-centric, never

merely theistic, it is Christian. It must re-proclaim again and again the revelation once made in history. It must recapitulate and re-present God's action in Christ with the faith that men will respond as they responded to the original revelation. Thus many of us would say that the norm of a Christian service ought to be the eucharist, by which we mean not that the Lord's Supper is necessarily the uniform type of service but that every service should embody the essential content and re-enact the saving event of our Lord's birth and death and resurrection. This content may be explicit or implicit. It may be embodied in prayer or scripture or song or in the ritual of Communion, or in the totality of the service. But however done, worship is only Christian when it recapitulates God's saving action in Christ, and a good test of the authenticity of a Christian service is whether the worship sacramentally conveys God's action and life offered to men in Christ. In this sense music is obligated to be sacramental no less than preaching or prayer or scripture ought to be sacramental.

But implicit in the encounter of man with God in Christ, is also the apprehension of God as living within man's consciousness and likewise in man's subconscious mind, God as Holy Spirit, which is to complete the Trinitarian theology of worship I am sketching. The Holy Spirit is simply God in his Christ-like nature present and self-communicative to the human person, and thus Christian worship is conceived and conducted, as we say, in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. But while the Trinitarian aspects of worship may be distinguished in analysis, they are not separable in the experience of worship itself; rather, they are apprehended in a unitary, dynamic way. Moreover, they are apprehended in a corporate way, and Protestant worship especially involves all the people. A congregation at worship is a gathered unity in Christ, in which each member, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is not only his own priest, but also priest for his fellow-worshippers, for the whole church and for the world. The offering of his individual worship to God is joined with the offering of all, and it is as much his duty to "do" the liturgy as the minister. The meaning of the word "liturgy" is instructive here. It originally meant "to perform a public duty", "to engage in work" involving the common life; and it may be construed in a religious sense to mean "the work of the people." The involvement and action of the people

are indispensable to the corporate character of worship as we know it in Protestantism.

Selecting Sacred Music

Against the background of this theological summary let us ask: how is music, then, to be conceived and performed in Christian worship?

Surely the first answer is that music must be chosen and performed as religious music and not as secular; and by "religious" I mean as having essentially to do with the fundamental relation of man's being with the God revealed in Christ. This relation of course is complex and many-sided, and offers a corresponding variety in the choice of music that expresses and impresses it. It further comprehends the totality of man's being and deals with him on levels that may not at first sight appear to be religious. But there is a minimal level of religious meaning below which music cannot be allowed to fall and still qualify as worship. When music fails to express or impress the relation of encounter between man and God, it fails as worship.

Now the first and decisive test of whether music is secular or sacred in this sense will lie in the text, and hence the text of every choral number must be carefully examined. It is not enough that it be good poetry or vaguely theistic or familiar to the people, and so on. It must be Christian. Another test will lie in the tune, but here the problem is more difficult because a tune *per se* is neither secular nor sacred; it is felt to be one or the other by the meaning that tradition and association have come to ascribe to it. It is possible, for example, for a hymn to qualify as religious in its text, as I have defined "religious", but to be disqualified because the tune hinders the relation between the soul and God. The Methodist hymnal offers two illustrations—Toplady's hymn, "Above the hills of time the cross is gleaming," set to the Londonderry Air, and Chadwick's text on the eternal life, "It singeth low in every heart," set to Auld Lang Syne. Almost certainly these tunes are theologically objectionable because their psychological association is secular. The tune hinders or corrupts the relation of the soul with God.

But I would extend this double test of text to apply to all music in worship, including anthems and solos, and also to

funeral and wedding music. Remember that funerals and weddings are always to be acts of worship, and when a dreamy-eyed bride comes to talk with you about appropriate music for her wedding, I trust you will make this crystal clear, especially when she may request you—as a student of mine once requested—to have sung "The Sweetheart of Sigma Chi"!

The Performance

Music further must be chosen and performed as religious music and not as art for art's sake, and here lies a particular peril for musicians. For worship so needs art, and art can do so much for worship. Indeed there is much to be said for the remark that in worship, at least, the cleft between religion and art today is more frustrating than the cleft between religion and science. So much Protestant worship fails today because it fails artistically. Yet worship cannot be said to succeed as Christian worship only if it suceeds aesthetically, for there is always the danger that the aesthetic will become an end in itself. None other than the late Dean Sperry has written that "to fail as artist so far as worship is concerned, is even more fatal than to fail as theologian". I cannot agree. The God of Christian worship is not first Beauty, and he does not first reveal and offer himself in Christ in the beautiful. No, he is first God in his "godness"; and he is "the Holy" before he is the Beautiful. Jesus, significantly, had surprisingly little to say about God as beauty—study the Gospels sometime to inquire into this—but he had a great deal to say about God as holiness, and as judgment, and as love, and it is the God, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is to be worshipped. Thus while worship can utilize every appropriate aesthetic means to affirm and establish the communion of man's soul with this God, you can never risk permitting the means to become the end.

This principle clearly rules out "concert music", operatic solos, Verdiesque duets, theatrical quartets and the like whose text or tune strikes one as aesthetic rather than religious. Especially it rules out music whose performance impresses people as being "arty", over-dramatic music when the dramatic element becomes an end in itself, or music sung as an interesting historical illustration of a certain period in the development of sacred music, a Schutz anthem, for example, when the people

are made more aware of Schutz than of God. It also rules out preludes and postludes whose content or performance belongs more to the concert hall than to the church, that impress one as being art before they are worship. How many organists can hardly wait for the benediction to begin their fanfare or trumpets! Any grace of artistic exhibitionism corrupts worship at its core.

Bound up with this is a problem that is theological and psychological as well as aesthetic, the problem of objective and subjective aspects of sacred music in light of the Trinitarian theology I have briefly laid down. We may define worship as objective when it is conceived and offered with primary reference to God, and we may say that it is subjective when it is conceived and conducted primarily in order to induce some desired experience in man. Now this is a thorny problem because it is too simple to say, as some people say, that "music in worship must always be objective, period", for music depends in large part for its very meaning on appeal to the senses and feelings; of all the arts it is perhaps the most subjective. Moreover, music as worship both expresses and impresses faith and as such subjectively involves the worshipper. Protestant music particularly involves the people, it seeks to bring them "to do the work" of the liturgy, and hence there must always be a sensitive awareness of what music is doing to the people. This requires, therefore, that you must mediate between what you judge to be the "best" music theologically and artistically, and the capacities of your people to accept the meaning of such music. Your task here is difficult and delicate, for "best" is a relative term. What may be "best" for a musician may not be "best" to your people, and what may seem "best" to your people may not be "best" in terms of worship. Many factors enter in here, and not least what Ashton calls "the associational factor", i.e., the power of music to recall emotional associations of past religious experience in a poignant way. The man who reproaches you, for example, for not singing more often "I Love to Tell the Story," may only be saying that he enjoys the emotional rather than the religious associations of that hymn because it makes him think of his mother! But I would not rule out the possibility that he may also unconsciously be saying that he is heartened in his Christian faith and life by the religious associations of that hymn in a very real way, and I for one, in the name of "objectivity", would not be willing to deprive him too often of

an experience of religious reality by depriving him of what to me may seem to be excessively "subjective" music.

Having said this, however, let us remember that because worship is first theocentric and Christocentric, the predominant dimension of all sacred music must be objective. The fundamental thing here is the direction, the intention, of the music, especially in its performance. Indeed, we might conceptualize the relation between the subjective and objective aspects of sacred music by saying that sacred music must always be objective in intention even though it is subjective in effect. Music ceases to be worship, in other words, when it is conceived or rendered with the primary intention of affecting the people. It does not cease to be worship when it is primarily offered to God even as it inevitably affects the people. The overall context of a service is probably crucial here. It is possible, for example, to have an occasional hymn or anthem of a more subjective character if the predominant frame and movement of a service in its totality is healthily objective; this will sometimes be proper theologically and wholesome psychologically and may provide for the alternating interaction between the human soul and God. Further, it is possible to have hymns whose grammatical meaning may seem to be subjective but whose over-all impact in text and tune is objective. William P. Merrill's hymn, "Rise up, O men of God," in one sense is subjective; yet there is something bracing and healthy about its net impact, summoning men to a relation of loyalty and service to God. Yet the risk is great, especially with music whose tune is highly emotional, for emotion kindled by music can be destructive, and the belief that the emotional impact of music per se is moral, is a fallacy. But music can not only stir emotion that is religiously unwholesome; it is also conceivable that even wholesome emotion can short-circuit resolution. The right kind of a relation between man and God, as we said earlier, involves man's whole being, and Hocking's definition of worship is salutary here: "Worship is a transaction between man and God in which will answers Will."

But the manner in which music is performed is equally important, whether it is rendered in such a way as to convey the feeling that it is being sung to the congregation rather than to God. Architecture will sometimes defeat you here, but wherever possible the choir ought not to face the people, and soloists

likewise should not turn to face the people; they ought rather to sing to God and let the people, as it were, listen in. The director of the choir should be hidden, and all the mechanics concealed in order not to draw attention to themselves. Vestments should be in restrained taste and uniform. Processionals and recessionals should not be artificially theatrical nor prolonged, though when a processional serves a clear-cut religious purpose for example, when it symbolically proclaims the doctrine that members of the Christian Church have undertaken a victorious march whose consummation is in heaven) it may have an element of legitimate drama. In short, the performance of sacred music should correspond to its basically objective intention.

The Function of the Choir

The limits of time prevent me from saying many more things I would like to say about the implications of theology for sacred music. But there is one thing I must add, stemming from the principle that Protestant worship is distinctively corporate, and that music, set within this corporate context, must involve the people. This principle has to do with nothing less than the fundamental nature and function of a choir. Theologically a choir ought to be thought of as the people, and the people ought to be thought of as the choir. But actually today in much Protestant worship the choir has come to be generally thought of as acting for the people, or—what is worse—*on* the people, so that the corporate character of worship through music is often lost. Chants, for example, are often sung only by the choir, especially in the free churches. Hymns are crowded out by anthems and solos. Perhaps one sees this theological error most clearly in the widespread custom of permitting the choir to steal all the "amens" in a service, thereby cheating the people of one of the great acts and privileges of Christian worship. For the Christian "amen" means much more than the Hebrew "so be it"; it has a profound, eschatological meaning fulfilling the Hebrew meaning. The mercy, righteousness and truth of God to whose revelation and fulfillment the Jews looked forward, have been given us in Christ; in him the Messianic age has come; through his redemption we share even now in his victory and kingdom, and in that assurance we offer and seal our prayers. Again and again I have

been in services where every blessed "amen" was sentimentally intoned by the choir, while the people meekly sat by unaware that a great religious and theological affirmation to which they were entitled, was being perverted into dubious aesthetic decoration.

But the corporate character of worship also involves the choirmaster's conception of himself and his office, and the heart of it is this: Do you conceive yourself in your work to be part of the worshipping community—the Church? Do you look on yourself first as a professional musician or as a minister, and do you realize that in the end your contribution will depend less on your technical competence than on your own religious devotion in making your music a sacrament of God's grace? We cannot expect that one who offers up music as a sacrifice through which God re-enacts his salvation in Christ, can be exempt from the same religious and moral claims that are pronounced upon the clergyman and the people. Do you think that a leader of the apostolic church such as St. Paul, for example, would have said that musicians are not entrusted with one of the diversities of gifts of the Spirit, as others are called to be teachers and pastors, and that musicians can be amiable Bohemians or temperamental prima donnas, exempt from the moral and spiritual claims of the Gospel just because they are musicians? I have often reflected on this while listening to anthems sung in a service, for many if not most anthems are prayers or rendered in the spirit of prayer; and as prayer offered by a clergyman or anyone else is infinitely more than technique, so is music in worship infinitely more than technique. This is to say, your music will be sacred or not depending to a large degree on your own faith and character and devotion. And if you ask what difference these make if your are competent technically, I will reply with an analogy of the late Dr. Albert Palmer of Chicago, who has written that the difference is like that between the same music played on two different violins, one cheaply and carelessly made, the other a Stradivarius, mellow and beautiful in tone. What matters most and what sounds through is "the essential tone of the soul".

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The Training of the Parish Minister

Samuel W. Blizzard

During the past two years it has been my happy privilege to work intensively with five seminaries on "A Study of the Functions of the Parish Minister" in the United States. Union Theological Seminary has furnished the leadership in this project. The Russell Sage Foundation initiated the project and provided the implementing funds. One aspect of the study has been the cooperation of parish ministers who are alumni of the five seminaries. To give broader scope to the findings, several hundred ministers who are graduates of more than eighty other seminaries were also invited to participate. The published report will not be available for some months. This article does not anticipate the content of the book which will report the survey. It is rather an attempt to point out some of the bench marks that have already been found in this survey of parish minister opinion, about the task of the ministry and theological education.

Parish ministers are aware that the structure of American society and the values of American culture are changing. Structurally it is becoming much more complex. Culturally Americans seem to be focusing more of their interests on a set of economic values that differ from those held when this was an agrarian rather than a commercial and industrial nation. The means that are effective in implementing the Gospel message, as the cultural situation changes, must be examined. It is appropriate that ministers are concerned about their ways of ministering at a time when there is also a resurgence of interest in theological thinking.

As parish ministers examine their task in the light of the revival in theology and in the view of many new characteristics of American society, there are several bench marks that are evident in their thinking. Only a few of these can be reported

in this brief article. These markers serve as reference points in their thinking, and point to some of the questions that they are raising about theological education.

One bench mark that present day parish ministers are seeking to establish is self-understanding. In a society that is changing rapidly, people are constantly faced with new definitions of their situations. The minister, who wishes to serve people in their need, finds that this situation requires that he have a degree of emotional resilience that may not have been required in a more stable and traditional way of life. The changing expectancies that parishioners and other community residents have of the minister are a challenge to any rigidity and a lack of permissiveness on his part. Faced with this situation, one thoughtful minister in a process of self-examination mentions: "The problem of me! The great struggle to overcome perfectionist patterns that arise out of inner compulsions trick me into discontent with what I am and have, so that time is lost in negative moods of inferiority, etc. I have some understanding of these things—but overcoming—comes hard." Parish ministers feel that seminaries should give greater emphasis to aiding the student in the development of maturity in his emotional life. An Illinois clergyman feels strongly that "if a minister knows himself and how to apply the Gospel to his own life, then he will be an effective pastor . . . . More help (should be given) to the minister as an individual!!"

The doctrine of the ministry that a clergyman holds is another bench mark. It is related to the view he has of himself. The way that he describes his work in day-to-day contacts in the parish is an indication of how he would prefer that people see him. The way in which he explains the work of the minister to people may be described as his working doctrine of the ministry. There are two dimensions to the working doctrine by which practicing ministers describe their work to people: the vertical and the horizontal. In the vertical view he describes himself as the servant of God, the mediator between God and man, and the evangelist of Jesus Christ. In the horizontal view he speaks of himself as the servant of all men, the inspirational leader and the pragmatic leader. To the extent that these two views of the minister are in conflict, or that one is held to the exclusion of the other, the minister faces a dilemma. The perennial predicament of the minister is how to maintain the vertical

view of himself and at the same time maintain a horizontal view that will help him function effectively in relation to people. This dilemma has implications for theological education.

Parish ministers are oriented as practitioners of religion. To this orientation must be added that of scholar and thinker. Clergymen feel that "we need in today's minister a combination of scholar, thinker, and man who is in touch with things as they are, who is motivated by an all-consuming love for people because they are God's redeemed." Any lack of integration of the scholastic and the practical creates a problem for the clergyman in the parish. Looking back, one alumnus of a well-known seminary writes, "A school as excellent as (my alma mater) in intellectual matters ought to try extra hard to balance with practical courses which are on a par in excellence with the back-ground courses. The aim ought to be primarily not to train teachers and scholars . . . . but the main emphasis should be on training pastors." Ministers who share this point of view state that, "the church must develop its theological schools in relation to the actual daily life of the church and her people. Otherwise theological education is too much of an abstraction." The practitioner orientation is a third parish minister bench mark for theological education.

The Offices of the Ministry

Traditionally the parish minister has been preacher, priest and teacher. These traditional offices of the ministry have theological meaning and there are acceptable and well defined behavior patterns by which they are performed in the parish. The complexity of society is re-defining some offices or creating newer ones that ministers are expected to fulfill. The clergyman is increasingly a pastor-counselor, organizer and administrator. The non-traditional offices are not as adequately understood in a theological context, nor are there well defined and acceptable behavior patterns by which the minister is thought to be fulfilling them. This is particularly true for the roles of organizer and administrator. It is perhaps more accurate to say that the theology of the pastoral office is being redefined through the therapeutic understandings now associated with this office. The images that ministers have of the administrator and the organizer tend to be associated with that of the business executive

and the social worker rather than that of a theologically oriented person. Parish ministers feel inadequately trained for the non-traditional offices. To the extent that the offices of counselor, organizer and administrator become more important in the parish, this need for training that alumni express becomes a new bench mark for theological education.

Parish ministers have a normative view of their work. This involves their concept of an ideal ministry and the goals that they have in the parish. It is the way they think things should be and is reflected in the offices that they rate as being most important. Normatively, the preaching office is seen as most important. The organizational, administrative, and teaching offices are thought to be least important. The pastor and priest roles are of middle range importance. The time that ministers spend in performing the offices in the parish reflects the functional view. The order from most time consuming to least is as follows: administrator, pastor, preacher and priest, organizer, and teacher. Normatively the offices are in one order of priority, and functionally they are in another order of priority. The enjoyment that men find in fulfilling the offices is related to the normative concept of the ministry rather than the functional. This means that the minister is placed in one set of role expectancies where ends are considered, and another set of role definitions where means are the criteria. Ends are related to the normative and means to the functional. Since the things that they do well and enjoy support the ends rather than the means, then the means, ends and motivations are incongrous. Ambiguities regarding the offices of the ministry may be expected to arise where the ideal (normative) is in sharp contrast with the real (functional), and where the satisfactions of the minister tend to reinforce his desire to approximate the idealistic rather than the realistic. In American society it may be expected that the counselor, organizer and administrator functions will continue to require large blocks of the minister's time. To the extent that this continues to be true, seminaries will need to help ministers develop a theology for these offices and acceptable behavioral means of fulfilling these offices.

A satisfactory relationship between the institutional goals of the church and the minister's sense of effectiveness is another bench mark that parish minister graduates of seminaries would like to establish. Ministers are of the opinion that the church expects them to work toward the fulfillment of many goals that

are peripheral to their basic function as a minister. The symbols of success in the denominations are in conflict with the minister's symbols of effectiveness in meeting the needs of people in the congregation. This conflict of goals has created ambiguities for the minister regarding the role he should play as the leader of a church. This feeling is the theme of an Ohio minister who wrote to the writer as follows: ". . . I feel that there are a good many ministers who feel rather lost. I'm among them. We simply cannot see where we are going in the church. Our churches are successful. We gain more members, we have more at church, we have bigger budgets, we have more activities, we have better Sunday School materials, and so on. But we can't see that we are making much of a difference in our communities or in the lives of the individual members of our communities. This disturbs me." Parish ministers look to the seminaries to help them in resolving this conflict in goals so that they may more effectively fulfill their mission.

The Seminary Training

The traditional content disciplines (biblical, historical, and theological studies) have been the backbone of seminary training. Parish ministers constantly feel a need for more training in these fields. The terms in which they express these needs are functional. Ministers want more training in the Bible as a working tool. They have respect for the technical aspects of biblical scholarship but they want "more study of the Bible rather than about it." The functional approach that they have toward more Bible training is also focused on their own devotional use of the Scriptures. Furthermore, their desire for more Bible training is motivated by the need they feel for the "use of the Bible in the parish." They feel that it is "basic to preaching," and are aware that "Sundays come with frightening regularity."

Parish ministers are highly appreciative of the training in theology that they had in seminary. Looking at this training from the perspective of the parish, they face several problems. One of these is a desire "for a means of translating the thought of theologians into the language of the laity." Another problem is the tension between the theoretical and the applied in theology. Parish ministers do not want "shallow applications of theology," but they do feel that they need "guidance and help in putting (the deepest truths of faith and life) to work dy-

namically for Christ." The implications of Christian ethics are a third area in theology where parish ministers want more training. They advise "prepare ministers to grapple with—not evade—the great and controversial problems of our time, in the light of Gospel imperatives." They want to know "how to lead people in a development of social consciousness, and (how) to motivate people of leadership with a Christian ethic." This would seem to provide a bench mark for theology in seminary training.

As new areas of knowledge are developed their usefulness in the training of ministers needs to be evaluated. Likewise as new developments occur in other scholarly disciplines the implications for theology are examined. The sciences, for example, have redefined the understandings of the natural world that are acceptable. Theological instruction has been changed by this fact. In the present century, the sciences of social behavior have made available new knowledge about people, groups, and culture. The developments in these sciences provide a new bench mark by which theological education may be guided. Seminary alumni feel that there should be more instruction in the social behavioral sciences (psychology, sociology, and anthropology) in the seminary. One parish minister suggests that "the dynamics of society and persons keeps recurring to me as a needed emphasis and point of reference for more strictly theological studies."

Prospective parish ministers are the largest group of seminary students. Those who are now in the pastoral ministry provide from their experience bench marks for an examination of theological education. The changing structure of American society and the revival of theology make this a propitious time to study the purpose and functioning of Protestant seminaries. Some of the bench marks for theological education that those in the pastoral ministry provide are a desire for self-understanding, a working doctrine of the ministry, the importance of the practitioner orientation, the need for a theology of the non-traditional offices of the ministry and behavior patterns to fulfill them, a clarification of success and effectiveness goals, and the functional use of substantive training in the content disciplines. To the extent that seminaries understand the problems of parish ministers and use these bench marks in structuring theological education, prospective ministers for the parish will be prepared for their task.

The Quest for a Biblical Metaphysic

Frank B. Dilley

The renewal of Biblical thinking and the attack upon the "Perennial Philosophy" from all sides today, the suspicion that ontology swallows up the Biblical proclamation, yet the extremes to which some "theologians of the Word" have gone because of their failure to deal with systematic problems, all manifest a need for some new attempt to relate Biblical revelation and philosophical thinking. One such modern attempt has been the Biblical Metaphysic suggested by Dr. Edmond LaB. Cherbonnier, whose ideas have greatly influenced me. This article is an attempt to present and defend such a Biblical Metaphysic. The name itself indicates both facets of this endeavor. The attempt is to use the Biblical way of looking at things, the Biblical world-view, as the basis for the system, without renouncing the contribution which philosophy, rightly used, can make. At first glance this seems to be what many philosophers of religion have done throughout Christian history, but there is a significant difference. Instead of regarding philosophy as a way of reaching ultimate reality unaided, Biblical Metaphysicians, accepting the insights of modern philosophers and logicians, regard philosophy solely as a method. Philosophy is an activity,—thinking clearly, consistently, coherently,—but it has no content. When one philosophizes, one examines a content philosophically, testing it for coherence, consistency, clearness. The content is always furnished; philosophy is purely formal. It is the content that is vitally important. Traditional philosophy has assumed the content of the Greeks, namely, that thought equals being,[1] has used as its content the general, the abstract, the logically prior. But it is not necessary that philosophy do so. The Biblical Metaphysic is an attempt to use a different content, the content of Jerusalem. Whereas traditional philosophy has lost the particular, the unique, in its search for abstract universals, the Bible places its emphasis on particulars, unique free beings. It is true that the Bible is not a philosophical book, that no de-

tailed metaphysics is presented therein, but this does not mean that no metaphysical position is expressed.

The Biblical Concepts

The Biblical content stresses free agents. The Bible portrays free agents, in or out of relation to God and their fellow men, acting, thinking, being acted upon. The key Biblical concepts are sin, grace, responsibility, love, redemption, justice, forgiveness, righteousness, all of which are concepts speaking of actions, involving relationships between persons. From the creation story to the messianic fulfillment the portrayal of free agents is continuous. God creates man in His own Image, free to rebel. Man rebels, the act of a free agent. The story is then of God's revelation of Himself to man in the attempt to win him back, (to *force* him back would contradict freedom). This stress underlies the whole Biblical narrative. In this respect, then, there is a metaphysics implicit in the Bible.

Many consequences follow from the premise that reality is free agents, when this premise is tested philosophically. Freedom implies a) that there is for man an objective standard of true and false, for a free agent is one who can choose, and there must be differences to choose between. Functionally, God is defined as this standard (cf. Cherbonnier's book, *Hardness of Heart,* page 40): b) that will, not reason, is of primary importance, for what is involved in free acts is acts of will: c) that actions are stressed more than thoughts. The key terms in such a metaphysic are terms such as "love," "faith," relatedness words, not knowledge words: d) that knowledge about the real comes *a posteriori,* not *a priori.* This follows from the fact that what is real is free agents and their acts. A free act cannot be deduced before it happens. One can only look to see *if* it has happened or not. This paper could not be deduced *a priori,* but once it is written it can be read and only thus *a posteriori,* be known to exist: e) that concrete existing individuals, not universals, are the most real. Properly I should speak of free agents, free acts, loving agents, not of "freedom" or "love" as existing realities. Such universals are short hand, used for convenience and for ordering the world, they are not pre-existent realities.

God, too, in the Biblical tradition, is a free agent. He loves, He acts, He speaks, and all of these are acts of a free agent. He is a God Who wills and Who acts. It is therefore not possible

to establish *a priori* that such a God exists. The most that could be done is to show that such a God is the only one philosophically consistent with such a world as there is (i.e. creation can really only be satisfactorily explained if there is a God who can say "let there be light" and there is light). This is very different from saying that there actually *is* such a God. One must look, *a posteriori,* to see if such a God is. Freedom and free agents cannot be completely included in a deductive system. To find out whether a person exists, or what a person is like, one cannot sit in a corner and deduce this person logically out of whole cloth, one is dependent upon "knowledge by acquaintance." [2]

Truth also must be conceived differently in a Biblical Metaphysic. Truth is no longer data about some universal, or abstraction from the flux of this world, but Truth is Someone (I am the way, the truth and the life) and refers to His purposes. Truth then does not consist in grasping objects, or in independently deriving the nature of some being, but in finding and relating oneself to Him who is ultimately true. Only those who have met God can know Him. He cannot be discovered by thinking *about* Him. Revelation is thereby preserved as a fundamental category. Only the man to whom God has revealed Himself knows Him, His nature is not deduced but discovered. Both words and acts are needed for this revelation because "without action mere words are ineffectual: without words, the purpose of an act can remain obscure." [3] Christian knowledge of God is historical, revealed in words and deeds.

It is important to note that grace is not excluded by the emphasis on free will. We love because He first loves us. Man is capable of turning to God because God, in Christ, through love has freed men to respond, has cleansed man from guilt, and has enabled man to enter into full personal relationship with God, has even drawn man to God, but freely.

Will and Reason

Before turning to some of the arguments often raised against attempts to relate religion and philosophy positively I should like to point to a concrete case dramatically illustrating the overwhelming influence which will can exert over reason. This may help us to see more clearly the reason why a philosophical position which is manifestly absurd to us, can be held by force of will alongside a Biblical position and be claimed to be reconcilable to it. I do not claim that the two cases are on the same level.

When in college I saw a feat of hypnosis, consisting of this: a young man hypnotized a girl and told her that those of us who were in the room had gone out of the room to a theater, and to impress this on her mind he told her the name of the picture currently showing and mentioned the time that we would return. Then he asked her where we were and she repeated what he had said. He pointed to a couch where one of us "absent" ones was sitting and ask her who was sitting there, she replied "No one." He then pointed to the magazine rack before which I was standing and asked her who was standing in front of the magazine rack and she said that there was no one there. Then he asked her to read the names on the front of the magazines on the top row going from left to right. She named those on my right, then those on my left. When asked about those in between she replied that she could not make out what they were. This experiment had not been prearranged, nor was he trying to demonstrate any point, but looking back on the experiment I saw it as an illustration of the predominance of will over intellect. Her senses and mind were operating at full capacity, she could see, and hear, and think as well as usual, but with one exception. A premise had been planted in her mind, the premise that we were not there. By act of will she clung to this premise, regardless of the evidence her senses and mind must have furnished her. Her system precluded our existence, *ergo* she did not see us. By act of will she overruled reason. This might be seen, as I later saw it, as a trivial illustration of the Biblical principle that idols blind those who worship them, that hearts are hardened by idolatry.

Lest one think that the influence of sin on reason is neglected in Biblical Metaphysic it should be pointed out that man is led to God, he does not reach God by reason alone. One of the characteristics of idols is that they blind and deafen their followers so that these followers can no longer see reality as it is. In the experiment above, the girl was unable to see me, her premise blocked her vision. Still, contradiction furnishes correction to some extent, though it is primarily experience which corrects. Experience forces some philosophers to include elements in their systems which are strictly contradictory, systematically, and at times almost to have split systems, yet they are blind to contradictions. This should be illustrated, but space does not permit. Dr. Cherbonnier in his articles gives illustrations.

Now we will turn to possible criticisms of this position. First of all, the philosopher may say that this whole endeavor is just

not philosophical. However, there seems to be no valid reason why we should accept this pronouncement. There is no philosophical reason why we cannot test out any premise we want to. There is abundant evidence that the usual philosophical premise leads to contradiction, so why not try a new premise, and test it? That the real is the rational is just simply not self-evident.

The Perils of Seeking Coherence

Dr. Niebuhr has raised some pointed perils in any endeavor to relate philosophy and Christian faith while acknowledging himself that "the whole of reality" is characterized by a "basic coherence."[4] He warns against any premature attempt to establish simple coherence. The first peril is that of minimizing the uniqueness of things and events by identifying meaning with rationality. Such a minimizing would indeed be unfortunate. The Biblical Metaphysic *stresses* the unique by its emphasis on free agents, warning that they cannot be subsumed under some rational category. The second peril is that a realm of coherence may stand in rational contradiction to another and that this contradiction should not be prematurely resolved. Dr. Niebuhr correctly cites cases in which this has been done. This can be admitted if one goes on to say that partial or false coherence systems may be involved, and the cases he cites are such. He is right that the problems are not easily solved in rational terms, and the Biblical Metaphysic does not attempt to do so. The third states that some configurations and structures stand athwart every rationally conceived system of meaning. This again can be admitted. If free agents are the real, *rational* systems cannot be satisfactory. Fourthly, genuine freedom cannot be conceived in any natural or rational scheme of coherence. Again, this can be admitted. The Biblical Metaphysic tries very much to guard against subsuming freedom to any rational scheme of coherence. Dr. Niebuhr has pointed out very ably the difficulties in those positions which espouse the content of Athens.

A further argument sometimes offered is that such a system limits God. God transcends all limitations which can be placed upon Him, including freedom. First of all the question should be asked as to whether or not being free is a limitation. It is certainly true that for those who hold to the content of Athens, freedom is a limitation; it is not so evident on any other terms. It is hard to conceive of something *better* or more real than a free agent. Freedom may be the apex of reality, a sort of North

Pole, after passing which you are going south again. This is suggested by the fact that attempts to describe what is beyond free agents have often been in terms applicable to sub-free agents, terms such as "changeless," "purposeless" and the like to which such descriptions often boil down. There has been no way offered to distinguish adequately personal (free agents) from super-personal without descending to the sub-personal, the reason perhaps being that personal is the highest category possible. The fact that the highest revelation of God is in a Person, and that God's Image is a free agent, also suggests this interpretation. Those who regard the most general as the highest category of course regard freedom as a limitation. Freedom implies change, purpose, multiplicity, it allows for rebellion, and is dependent upon separation, and all these are "evil" if the most real is the most universal, the absolute. In answer to this, it is by no means obvious that the most general is the highest. As far as we humans know from our experience it is unique, free agents that are the highest category of reality. If this is true, then to demand that God be the most abstract, a universal, or a universal ground, is to limit Him, it is to "logicomorphize" Him and thus limit Him. Which is to be normative for reality, logic or the free agent, if the latter can be shown to be more philosopically tenable as well as being truer to our experience? A secondary consideration is that God, in order to be God for man must be at least as free as man is. The prophets ridiculed idols because they could not act, while God identified Himself by His mighty acts.

Another argument sometimes offered is that to make Christianity philosophically consistent is to undercut faith and revelation. There are many depths to this question, but the argument is valuable only against a different kind of attempt to prove God's existence and nature, the cosmological or ontological attempt. Knowledge of God in the Biblical Metaphysic is "knowledge by acquaintance." The most philosophy can do is examine the world and say that if there is a God He must be a free agent. Philosophy can go no farther unless the philosopher meets God. Knowledge of God is derivative upon acquaintance with God, upon revelation and the acceptance of revelation. Then this knowledge can be "validated in retrospect" to use one of Dr. Niebuhr's phrases.

One argument which has arisen is that to include a free agent in a system is to subsume him to rational categories and thereby denies real freedom. It is necessary to note that in the Biblical

Metaphysic freedom is not subsumed. Freedom is the central category and its essence is maintained in its fullness. Free acts cannot be deduced *a priori,* and free acts are the central focus of this metaphysic. The great merit of this system is precisely that it preserves the uniqueness of free agents. In other philosophies freedom is abstracted from free agents and free agents are subsumed as instances of freedom, but in this philosophy free agents are not so subsumed. The real is free agents, not freedom.

Another possible objection is based on I-Thou philosophy. The argument is as follows: to have a philosophy about God is to turn God into an It, an object of thought. Any description of God is an I-It description. Dr. Buber maintains that God is the Thou who can never become an It, and that those who think that they are talking about God in I-It terms are mistaken, and have actually eclipsed God.

In the first place it can be argued that one must talk about God. Even the *via negativa* does not avoid describing God. The question is whether one has a good metaphysic or a bad metaphysic. But aside from this, the conception of God as free agent avoids the strictures placed upon I-It treatment. God cannot be contained or objectified because He is a free agent. A free agent is one who cannot be contained in rational structures. I can treat another person as an It but I cannot transform him into an It so long as he is free. It is perhaps possible to destroy his will and make him into an It, but then he is no longer free, he is no longer really a Thou. If God were a universal, then He would be an It, but He is not, He is a free agent. The fundamental question about the nature of God cannot be determined *a priori.* We must look to see what God has revealed Himself to be. The categories of Biblical revelation are personal ones. It further seems to be evident that only a person can fully enter into an I-Thou relationship and Buber says at times that God becomes a person in order to enter into relation with man, and at one place, describes God as Person before creation. Who but a free agent can decide to become anything?

It can also be objected that the "philosopher's faith" that the world is reasonable and that idols are self-overthrowing, (based on the goodness of creation and God's faithfulness), manifests too much confidence in reason. This is mitigated somewhat by attention paid to revelation. Natural man cannot find God by the use of reason. Only after man has met God in love can he know Him. In the second place, man has only reason to use

as a tool. Even when he sets limits on reason he is using reason to do so. Even when he says that thus and so is paradoxical he has seen the paradox by the use of reason. And thirdly, there does seem to be someone who overthrows our idols. Idols are self-refuting, although they can be maintained for a long time by act of will. A false content is seen as such when it works out into a contradiction. Idols are seen to be idols because they promise men things and cannot deliver them. The only philosophical requirement in the Biblical Metaphysic is that we think clearly, consistently, and coherently. All these are necessary, even the most extreme anti-philosophical thinkers try to think clearly, to use their words consistently and make their thoughts hang together in some coherent way. Reason, thus interpreted, is no bogey-man. The objection to reason, among Christians, has been to the idolatrous pretensions of reason to reach God unaided. This system is not objectionable on these grounds. God is reached only in encounter with Him.

At first glance it might seem that God's omnipotence is destroyed and His providence denied. This is not the case. All that is maintained is that God has limited Himself by creating other selves and by respecting their freedom. It is completely within His power to destroy what He has made if He wills to do so, just as by His will He created the world from nothing. This is a pluralistic conception, but it is rooted in a monism, God created the world and is its ultimate source and sustainer, but God is not the world. God and the world are metaphysically plural.

The Biblical Metaphysic has been presented only in bare outline. Many problems have not been examined as yet and the system has not been worked out in full detail. Yet the system as it stands seems promising and deserving of thoughtful consideration.

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1. A testimony to the binding power of "rational is real" is the unwillingness of those who oppose Plato to challenge his premise. Instead they frequently deny the possibility of knowledge, an unmaintainable position, as their knowledge of this impossibility shows. Kierkegaard, for example, accepts Hegel's definition of truth and has rightly seen that truth thus defined is impossible of achievement. Therefore he is forced to deny the possibility of philosophical truth. The Biblical Metaphysic denies the premise.
2. Cherbonnier, "Jerusalem and Athens", *Anglican Theological Review*, October, 1953.
3. Cherbonnier, "The Theology of the Word of God", *Journal of Religion*, January, 1953.
4. Niebuhr, "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith", *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, January, 1952.

Book Reviews

BIBLICAL RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR ULTIMATE REALITY, by PAUL TILLICH. *Chicago University Press, 1955. 85 pp., $2.25.*

Paul Tillich's influence on American theology has been a very profound and creative one, ever since Hitler unwittingly enriched our whole culture, and our theology in particular, by forcing him to emigrate to our shores. He has labored for two decades in the American theological vineyard and his influence has been a constantly growing one. His unique contribution was partly derived from his very great gifts of both mind and heart and partly from his complete mastery of both the philosophical and theological disciplines. He has lived constantly on many boundaries, but most of all on the boundary of theology and philosophy.

This little volume, embodying lectures given at the University of Virginia, is priceless because it is an even clearer statement of his position than many of his larger volumes. It has the additional merit that it states the contrast between an "ontological approach" to reality and the "radical personalism" of Biblical religion with more precision than many of his critics have stated it. Of course he also affirms the common concern of biblical religion and the metaphysical quest. This common concern is his preoccupation and he allows himself one of his rare personal outbursts in theological debate when he declares that the cavalier and condescending attitude of some theologians toward philosophy "infuriates" him. He criticises Harnack and Ritschl for interpreting the theology of the early Greek fathers as a capitulation to Greek ways of thought. It was, Tillich declares, a necessary enterprise because it related the Biblical concern for the ultimacy of the divine, in contrast to all idolatrous faiths, with the metaphysical search for ultimate reality. If God is not being itself or the "power of being", he is only one being among other beings and therefore not the true God.

The merit of Tillich's thought is that he not only states the issue between Biblical faith and the metaphysical search for "ultimate reality" fairly but that he tries to do justice to the peculiar insights of Biblical religion. He does not, like Hegel, regard Biblical faith as merely a crude form of picture thinking, which philosophy must refine. He insists that it is important for the religious person to experience the "holy" or the being which is of "ultimate concern" for us as a person, because he can not "be less than we are" which presumably means that he must have the same freedom which we have as persons. Prof. Hartshorne would say that he must have the capacity for self-transcendence, a capacity which is very difficult to bring within an ontological system. Incidentally, we face a semantic problem at this point: for if we define as "ontological" everything which concerns "being" there need not be any conflict between Biblical-poetic and philosophical ways of apprehending the divine. But if "ontology" means

the "science of being" it may be questioned whether the mystery and meaning of the divine can be comprehended "scientifically" or rationally and philosophically. Tillich admits this when he declares that the theologians were right in speaking of creation "ex nihilo", thereby defining creation as a mystery beyond the bounds of rational thought. If it is brought within the bounds of reason God is always transmuted into either the "structure" of being or into the "ground" of being from which particular beings emanate.

Tillich is certainly right in calling attention to the necessity of using philosophical tools in eliminating all forms of idolatry (that is, the ascription of ultimacy to finite values and powers as the center and source of meaning) but he probably does not take seriously enough that the prophets of the Old testament were as rigorous as the Greek philosophers in their rejection of all finite Gods. They did this by their insistence that the true God was the creator of the world.

The real problem with Tillich's very imposing system of thought is, for one admiring colleague at least, that he interprets the religious problem correctly as the problem of the "meaning of our existence" but somewhat dubiously equates the question of meaning with the question of being and non-being. He would overcome despair by proving to men that their contingent being is grounded in ultimate being. This may be an answer for the metaphysically inclined and gifted. But it is more probable that the real question about meaning is not whether the world rationally coheres in some structure of being but whether the coherence can give meaning to the strange drama of human existence, considered either individually or collectively. This drama has tangents of meaning and suggestions of meaninglessness. The threats of meaninglessness are not overcome by a faith which asserts the ultimate coherence of things, but by a faith which takes the incoherences into its system of meaning. That is why the love and trust of our fellows as indices of the character of ultimate reality may more frequently save us from despair than metaphysical speculations about being and non-being. This is also why the Christian faith makes the scandalous cross into the very center of meaning for human existence: it asserts that a suffering love which was not triumphant in history is nevertheless the light that shines in darkness, because faith apprehends this suffering love to be a revelation of the very nature of "ultimate reality".

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

THE NEW BEING, BY PAUL TILLICH. *New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955. 179 pp., $2.75.*

Not every professor of philosophical theology makes a name for himself in the pulpit as well as the classroom. Paul Tillich did so long ago. Successive generations of students testify to his originality and power as a preacher. It has been my misfortune that when he was preaching in the chapel of Union Theological Seminary I was similarly occupied elsewhere. Here, however, for all who have not been able to hear the author of *Systematic Theology* and *The Protestant Era* preach is a selection of sermons he has delivered in colleges and universities during the last eight years.

None of the sermons is topical in the customarily accepted sense of that word among preachers. Contempor-

ary issues are dealt with but the reader never has the impression that the preacher is striving above and beyond everything else to address himself to "the issues of the hour." The point of departure is always a biblical text or passage, and in instance after instance the biblical exposition is sustained throughout the entire sermon. Every preacher knows that the major problem in biblical exposition is to keep relevant to life and to maintain interest. It is a problem with which Tillich has apparently little difficulty. He is no intellectual alien. Beginning with scriptural insights he quickly comes to grips with the religious and moral problems confronting men and women in the modern world.

These sermons are *sui generis* and defy classification. Always one is aware of an original and creative mind at work. A reviewer once suggested that a certain author might have left out of his book a lot that he knew and put in more that he thought. There is no parading of scholarship in Tillich. To the best of my recollection I encountered only one quotation in the whole book, and that, not from a contemporary author but from Luther's book, *The Bondage of the Will.* The independence of the thinking is matched by the austerity of the argument and the style. Tillich's hearers—and readers—have to think with him; their thinking is not done for them, nor are matters so simplified as to leave one feeling that all has been said that needs to be said. Time and again the subject is no more than opened up, though with masterly incisiveness, and the onus is placed on the hearer or reader to do some serious thinking on his own.

Every sermon is not for everybody. Of necessity this book will be limited in its appeal. It is unlikely that Tillich will be plagiarized. The type of man, his own mind a blank, who casts about for homiletical substance on Friday night or Saturday morning will not find much *ad hoc* material here. But those who are wide awake for homiletical suggestion will be amply rewarded. They may not put the book down in order to make a note of an arresting incident, an apt quotation, a brilliant epigram. The chances are that it will contribute little directly to their sermon source material. On the other hand, they will repeatedly put it down to think over and think through the insights which make it one of the most stimulating and provocative volumes of sermons published in recent years.

ROBERT J. MCCRACKEN

THE BIBLE SPEAKS TO YOU, by ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN. *Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1955. 320 pp., $3.00.*

This book was written primarily for the curricular uses of the Board of Education of the Presbyterian Church USA. It would be a shame and a loss if for this reason it were passed over by the wide constituency of Christian laymen and honest enquirers. For it is a major effort in an enterprise which has been lagging: the translation and interpretation of the results of the contemporary Biblical revival to those who are untrained in technical theology.

Bob Brown (why should we be formal in referring to him when his own work has such a pleasant informality about it?) is quite commonly regarded, and with reason, as potentially one of the most influential of the younger theological teachers. He

has already done valuable service by re-introducing—in *P. T. Forsyth: Prophet for Today*—the work of one of the most important theologians of the last 100 years. And he has varied such weighty—though by no means dull—undertakings. He has turned out a series of light-hearted but serious-minded articles in every kind of medium from *Presbyterian Life* to the *New Yorker* magazine.

The present volume has the combination of theological acumen and lightness of touch which a record of this sort would lead one to look for. It is immensely readable, and it is well worth reading by anyone, theologically literate or otherwise, who wants to see what thorough scholarship, a lively mind and a devout Christian heart can do with the Biblical scriptures.

The arrangement of topics is at first sight mysterious, even arbitrary: but it is the result of some years of consultation between the author and the best pedagogic brains of the Presbyterian Board, and no doubt embodies a wealth of pedagogic wisdom which is inaccessible to the layman in education. The early chapters do the very necessary work of setting out the Biblical documents in order and showing their connection and relation: and in this section even Hexateuchal scholarship becomes palatable, and the literalists (the prime purpose and constituency of the book requires that conversation be held with them) are chided goodnaturedly:

> To put every part of the Bible on the same level of importance as every other part is to find oneself in the difficulty which faced the man who opened his Bible at random to get light on a difficult problem, and had the misfortune to light on the words, "And Judas went and hanged himself." Not content with this cold comfort, he tried again, this time opening to the words, "Go and do likewise." (p. 19).

The following chapters develop the content of the Bible, using a variety of novel typographical, literary and artistic devices to overcome the difficulty that nearly everyone, without having read the Bible, thinks he already knows what's in it. All of these devices are worth trying, some of them are very ticklish to handle, but in nearly every case they are manipulated triumphantly. On p.287, for example, we are invited to glance at "the transcripts of some hearings of the first century Committee on Un-Roman Activities", and are then introduced to a lively diologue between the apostles and their accusers which is as contemporary as sin and is yet based squarely on the record of the Book of Acts. The final chapters take illumination out of the Bible on such vexed and difficult questions as Sex, Ballots (citizenship) and Bullets (war): and the whole book represents the most valiant attempt we have seen thus far to make it clear that the world's worst-read best-seller contains indeed a very true and *lively* word.

ALEXANDER MILLER

THE STRANGENESS OF THE CHURCH, BY DANIEL JENKINS. *New York, Doubleday & Co., 1955. 188 pp., $2.95.*

This latest book in the *Christian Faith Series* edited by Reinhold Niebuhr reminds us of the professed aim of the series and of the varying degrees to which this and other volumes of the series have met the specifications. Doubleday tells us that these books are "designed to bring to

the intelligent general reader the work of major thinkers in today's theological renaissance." It would be an interesting experiment to ask the authors of this series to describe the "intelligent general reader" to whom they are supposed to address their arguments and exposition. Some of the authors apparently credit him with extraordinary theological interest and intellectual comprehension. Some of them (this reviewer has in mind especially Alexander Miller in his exciting book, *The Renewal of Man)* seem to have been designed for an audience made up largely of literary-minded intellectuals, gifted with unusual powers of sensing subtle meaning and delicate over-tones. Daniel Jenkins writes in simple, direct sentences and with a plain and forthright over-all plan of treatment. He has a gift for memorable sentences which will commend this book to many "intelligent general readers". Speaking of preaching, he says, "Even if he (the preacher) is the most silvery-tongued and dynamic of spellbinders, with all the statistics from *Time* magazine and the little stories from the *Readers' Digest* ready to hand, it is an impertinent imposition for him to thrust his irrelevant cleverness upon a congregation who should be seeking guidance from God in His Word. The saving virtue of true preaching is not eloquence or sincerity: it is faithfulness." (Page 84). On the question of the Church's relationship to society: "It has often been noted that when the average Englishman says about some burning topic, 'Why doesn't the Church do something?' he generally means, 'Why don't the bishops say something?' " (Page 123). On the question of the Church's success or failure in society: "When the Church meets hardship or persecution instead of peace and prosperity, it does not follow that it is failing...It could mean that the power of the good is so strong in the life of the Church that it is drawing out the power of evil in opposition to it." (Page 167). Mr. Jenkins' style and vocabulary seem to suit extraordinarily well the specifications that the publishers have laid down for him.

What is not clear is that he has met the "intelligent general reader" in terms of his interests and concerns. This is a book about the Church written for "insiders". Only now and then does the argument focus itself upon the serious and concerned "outsider" who is wondering what the Church can possibly have to do with problems of personal insecurity and insignificance or problems of social disintegration and fragmentation. The chapter on "Sacraments", for example, begins by addressing itself to questions raised about the place of the sacraments in the life of the Church by *Churchmen* of the various traditions. Would it not be more appropriate to address such a chapter to the false "spirituality" of the average man, which sees no religious meaning in the material problems of life? The sacrament of the Holy Communion has a message of corporate unity achieved by corporate offering and corporate renewal which the modern disintegrating society needs to hear and experience. Only occasionally does Mr. Jenkins fix his attention on those outside the Christian Church (cf. a section on pp. 162-163 on the disintegrating effects on society of an abandonment of the Church experience, concluding with the warning: "Sin has..worked something which looks very much like death.")

If the book fails in its direction, however, it is highly useful nevertheless for the committed Christian as a thoughtful and stimulating treatment of the nature and function of the Church. This book can be enthusiastically commended to the readers of the *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, but are we the "intelligent general reader" Doubleday has in mind?

JOHN M. KRUMM

HARDNESS OF HEART, by E. LA B. CHERBONNIER. *New York, Doubleday & Co., 1955. 188 pp., $2.95.*

Here is an incisive essay on the Christian doctrine of sin. The author brings to his task wide reading in philosophy, theology and literature, a singleminded viewpoint, and not least of all a felicitous turn of phrase. The last trait is illustrated by the definition of sin as "misplaced allegiance." Against all faiths and philosophies which deny or obsure the fact, Cherbonnier argues that man is irreducibly free and therefore responsible. These traits have their genuine fulfilment in the service of God. This is the allegiance which fulfils man's nature, liberating or releasing his capacity for love. But man is also free enough to refuse this supreme allegiance to God, giving it rather to other lesser objects. This act is the essence of sin, and its inevitable accompaniment is a hard heart. The book incidentally is more concerned with diagnosis than prescription; it has more to say about sin than about sin's forgiveness.

All faiths and philosophies have some interpretation of human good and evil. Sin is the biblical or Christian interpretation of this universally human problem. It is to be sharply contrasted with two other views, (1) the tragic conception of an inherent flaw in human nature and (2) the moralistic notion of sin as the violation of a law or code for conduct. While the latter is a frequent pitfall for religious people, Cherbonnier points out the way in which such Christian thinkers as Augustine and Luther fall at times into the first error.

True ideas, the author argues are susceptible of consistent elaboration, while false ideas may upon such elaboration be shown to involve contradictions. On such a basis Cherbonnier argues for his biblical or Christian view of sin against its various alternatives, from the days of ancient Greek philosophy to the days of modern science and its philosophies.

One of the most suggestive sections of the book deals with the Augustinian-Pelagian controversy over grace and free will. In this quarrel the author feels that both Augustine and Pelagius had a point, but each involved himself in contradiction. A return to the biblical perspective would, he feels, save what is valid and eliminate what is untenable in both views.

If there is a defect in this book it is the exclusive attitude amounting at times I fear to genuine narrowmindedness which informs much of the discussion. The author's successive excommunication (i.e., their exclusion from what he holds to be a "biblical" or "Christian" viewpoint) of many if not most of the major theological figures of the past and present leaves him at the end in a very small company. His frequently unqualified use of the terms "biblical" and "Christian" to modify the viewpoint for which he speaks raises more questions than it solves.

The spirit of Tertullian seems to motivate some of his arguments. While Cherbonnier points to the errors and inadequacies in viewpoints opposed to his own, a more catholic spirit might equally see elements of truth spread more widely through the world. To be sure, they are, as Cherbonnier points out, often dangerous half-truths. Yet this is all the more reason to seek their rehabilitation and adequate articulation. There is, incidentally, quite as much basis in the Christian tradition for this attitude as there is for Cherbonnier's opposite and exclusive attitude.

It is very important that a genuine dialogue take place between Christian faith and human culture, and the author of this book is well equipped to participate creatively in that dialogue. It cannot take place if Christian faith does not take a stand. But it will also be jeopardized if Christian faith is stated in so exclusive and sectarian a spirit as to cut off genuine communication.

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

RELIGION IN CRISIS AND CUSTOM, A SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY, by ANTON T. BOISEN. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955. 271 pp., $4.00.*

Anton Boisen, an alumnus of Union Seminary in the class of 1911, has pioneered in the effective use of religion in aiding the mentally ill, both as a founder of the movement for the clinical training of theological students and by many years of service as a chaplain in mental hospitals. His early ministry was interrupted by what he calls a "mental disorder... of the most profound and unmistakable variety" sending him "into the wilderness of the lost", from which he emerged with the strong conviction that those able to meet such crises without surrender of hope and the will to recovery might gain thereby creative spiritual insights such as the prophets and Jesus, and in later days men such as Wesley and Fox had experienced. This was the thesis of his first book, *The Exploration of the Inner World*, dealing largely with his own schizophrenic disorder, with its sense of cosmic identification and purpose. It remains the thesis of this present book, which goes further, to find in the social crises of history the sources and seed beds of new spiritual truths and movements. But crisis may either make or break. Every major crisis offers the individual or the nation confronting it the alternatives of despair and destruction or of hope and a spiritual creativity which cracks the mold of custom and builds new organizations of life and of society.

He tests this thesis in an extravagantly wide range of social situations, beginning with a Midwestern county where churches and sects demonstrate the birth, maturity and decline of religious organizations, and the sects are seen to be the outgrowth of economic distress; proceeding to the study of a small village with but one church, grown static in habit and custom, and with more than its fair share of maladjusted people; thence, in chapter four, turning again to the crises in individual lives, classifying reaction patterns and citing individual cases to prove his thesis—the potential creativity of crises, especially in schizophrenic disturbances—again repeating the significant pattern: "In many cases his eyes are opened to the fact that he is more important than he had ever dreamed"; in chapter

five, finding in the Pentecostal sects groups as creative in crisis as individuals are, and presenting a keen and sociologically valuable analysis of their motivations and behavior; then offering a superficial analysis of war as social crisis but significantly concluding that "in time of war the reaction pattern is of the malignant rather than of the benign variety," hence altogether sterile since hate and blame destroy religious creativity; and in chapter seven, studying religious leaders and the social factors which condition their effectiveness, with emphasis upon their creativity in crisis.

He offers next a study of the transition of Methodism from sect to church, then a Weberian *tour de force* in eight pages, "Creativity and Conservatism in the History of Religion," followed by a more careful study of the same factors in American Protestantism in which he finds "relatively little weight given to custom and tradition." Next comes "The Development and Validation of Religious Faith" as a vital part of the second process, and next "Central Tenets of American Protestantism," with a perhaps unavoidable increase in dogmatic and *ipse dixit* conclusions seemingly derived largely from mental hospital cases. The last two chapters reach a climax of sweeping and authoritarian generalizations which leave this reviewer dazed but rebellious. Chapter thirteen deals with "The Perpetuation and Re-Creation of Religious Faith" concluding that "with all its weaknesses and wastefulness the American system does stimulate creativity." The reviewer wonders if this is because it so consistently produces crises. And the last chapter courageously dares to predict if not quite to pronounce the outcome of "The Present Crisis and Future of Christian Civilization." The reader will be relieved to know that "We have thus in America a more or less successful demonstration of the type of relationship which ought to prevail throughout the world among men of different races and faiths." Truly we *are* the people, and Dr. Boisen is our prophet. Or is he merely bringing us comfort *in extremis?*

ARTHUR L. SWIFT, JR.

RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN MENTAL ILLNESS, BY WAYNE E. OATES. *New York, Association Press, 1955. 239 pp., $3.50.*

Professor Oates is giving us in several recent books some of the results of an extraordinarily rich experience in the field where psychiatry and religion are interrelated. The present volume is devoted to an exploration of the part which religious factors play or fail to play in the life of the mentally ill. He writes with discerning insight into the deeper meanings of disturbances in personality and into the deeper meanings in religious faith.

The theoretical orientation shows intimate familiarity with psychiatric theory as well as practice, but it also shows intimate familiarity with the cloaks which the disturbed can draw over themselves. Thus he writes suggestively of "self-deception and self-encounter in the religion of the mentally ill," and under that heading, treats the preoccupation of the mentally ill with: the unpardonable sin, flesh versus spirit, the unforgiving legalist, the confusion of the God idea and the self, the end of the world, and the Messianic idea. He has a suggestive classification of

groups in our religious culture as they relate themselves to the making and the breaking of personality; his classification being perfectionistic groups, "second-coming groups," aesthetic groups, and leader-deification groups.

He draws some distinctions between healthy and unhealthy religion, treats the positive work of religion in the therapy of the mentally ill, deals with the relations between the minister and the psychiatrist with appreciation of each but without undue deference to either. One of the most useful features of the book is the way in which the entire treatment is pervaded by insights into the role which unhealthy religion takes in hindering recovery and the corresponding role which healthy religion has in recovery from mental illness.

Professor Oates is well known to several recent generations of Union Theological Seminary students who have either studied with him during his teaching here or have read his writings. This book, it can be predicted, will be useful for many years as a source for the better understanding of some aspects of religious thought and experience which tend to perplex those who devote themselves to the psychiatric end of the relation between psychiatry and religion. It should also serve equally well to interpret psychiatry to those whose primary concern is with the theological end of the relationship.

LEWIS J. SHERRILL

THE REFORMATION ERA, 1500-1650, by HAROLD J. GRIMM. *New York, The Macmillan Co., 1954. 675 pp., $6.50.*

In view of the fact that there are so few modern English textbooks of the history of the Reformation, the publication of this work by Professor Grimm (of the University of Indiana) must arouse special interest.

It must be said at the outset that it deserves to be widely used, for it is reliable throughout. The author is obviously acquainted with the whole breadth of recent Reformation research. (He has appended to his book a very extensive bibliography, chiefly of works in English, which reflects not only his own wide reading but also the broad range of investigation that has been carried on by modern historians in the endeavor to illuminate the beginnings of the so-called "modern era"). While it is his purpose to present the general history of the whole "Reformation Era," he puts the stress chiefly on the history of the church—as it is proper to do, for the Reformation was the decisive factor in the development of European civilization from the beginning of the sixteenth century until the end of the Thirty Years' War.

The picture of the evolution of Protestantism which he presents is balanced: All major phases of the Reformation, Lutheranism, Zwinglianism, Calvinism, Anglicanism, and the "radical" movements (the Anabaptists, Spiritualists, and Humanists) are judiciously characterized and placed in relation to one another and to the trends of the times. The objective, impartial yet full-bodied analysis and description of this grouping of the Reformation churches constitutes the chief value of the book, for most other works on the Reformation are marked by the denominational or the national partisanship of their authors.

Professor Grimm's calm treatment of the Counter-Reformation from the Council of Trent to the Thirty Years' War is equally meritorious. Only the

chapters which he devotes to social and cultural history are not quite satisfactory, because they are much too brief. Parts of them are hardly more than an encyclopedic listing of names.

I assume that the book is meant to serve as a textbook. It will not disappoint its readers, for it will teach them well what they ought to know about the Reformation. They will not be led astray, but neither will they be electrified by a sense of excitement at being witnesses of the way in which Luther and his contemporaries brought about a complete transformation of the Christian religion and of the forces of Western civilization.

WILHELM PAUCK

CHALLENGE AND CONFORMITY; STUDIES IN THE INTERACTION OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE WORLD OF TODAY, by KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955. 126 pages, $1.75.*

Professor Latourette has developed from lectures to European universities and the theological faculties an instructive and stimulating little book. The author brings to his task historical perspective and much previous study and writing on the subjects treated. Indeed, the chief complaint to be brought against the new volume is that those who have carefully read Latourette's main works in Christian history and certain previous lectures will identify in new arrangements materials already familiar. When the same artist swiftly paints several times from the same large scenes, the pictures are bound to resemble each other in many elements, though the later views vary individually in angle, in frame, and in recently altered detail.

Americans generally lack the comprehensive knowledge and insight presented in the essay on "Christianity in the Environment of Present-Day Europe." Our courses in church history, denominational history apart, usually falter at the nineteenth century and expire early in the twentieth. Moreover, we get dangerously rare glimpses of the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches in what was long *the* Christian continent and now is a mingling of shadow and light as seen from across the Atlantic. More penetrating studies of this subject are needed, but this sketch will be useful to not a few readers.

Some Americans will be interested and helped still more by looking down historical and European lines at "The Distinctive Features of the Christianity of the United States." Are our religious outlook and practice considerably determined by a general American way of life, or does our religion significantly direct and affect that pattern? Here is a body of useful data and a suggestion of answer.

Asia and Africa are the areas treated under the title, "The Response of Christianity in Non-Occidental People and Their Cultures." The varieties of peoples and cultures cover a much wider range than those of Europe and the United States. Protestant minorities hold the center of the presentation, though Roman Catholic bodies and their characteristics are shown for comparison. Although the fundamentals of this survey are found in volumes IV to VII of the author's "History of the Expansion of Christianity," they are brought through the decade of momentous change, catastrophic for Eastern Asia, since that big series was completed.

Introductory and concluding statements set forth the author's *credo* of the power of evangelical faith vigorously interacting with all the stuff of life. Yet many evidences of the drive of general culture upon visible Christianity are frankly indicated.

M. SEARLE BATES

NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY, by ETHELBERT STAUFFER. *New York, The Macmillan Co., 1955. 373 pp., $4.25.*

This very important work has had to wait a long time for publication in English. It first appeared in Germany during the war, in an edition which included plates illustrating N. T. theological ideas from great Christian art; after the war an abridged edition (minus the plates) was published by the Church World Council in Geneva; since then new editions have appeared in Germany; the present translation, by Principal John Marsh, is from the fifth German edition. The work is beautifully printed and is destined to be in use for a long time to come. Its chief merit is its emphasis upon the Jewish background of the N. T. Where Professor Bultmann in his great two-volume work stresses the Graeco-Roman background, Stauffer stresses the Jewish apocalyptic. This, he insists, is the closest-up area of background, and it is against this foil that the N. T. ideas are to be interpreted.

Another point of value is the book's brevity. Some paragraphs are little more than skeleton outlines, perhaps lecture notes; they could—and can—be amplified considerably. And they are provocative. Some of the author's statements are his own judgments, starkly stated: a student ought to check and see if the evidence is quite as strong as the author assumes. See p. 107, where the author maintains that "primitive Christianity is both prehellenistic and antihellenistic." Yes; but how long did this "primitive" stage last? Or p. 111: Paul derived his idea of Christ as "the Man" from the gospel tradition of The Son of Man. Did he, or was this (see the context) an interpretation of the creation story in Genesis? Or 119: The Logos appears in a form "which for a long time has been alien and hostile to the Creator, the form of the historical." Is this warranted by the N.T., by contemporary (not later) Judaism, or by early Christian thought generally? Or is it a bit of Barthian theology squeezed in between the lines?

These are questions that rise up out of the pages and demand further research and a fuller answer. That is what makes the book such a fine textbook, and may explain why the author is such a good teacher. Some of the extended notes are magnificent, e.g. the one (p. 275) on the interpretation of Romans 7, or those (299 ff.) on the early eucharist. They are perfectly clear and beg no questions; and even if one does not agree a hundred per cent, they form a fine base of operations for further study.

The translation is very good on the whole, though there are some lapses. Paul is called "an apocalyptic" (261), and "Sp." should be translated —it means *column;* some of the abbreviations used in the book are not explained in the table.

If I should venture to offer one word of criticism, it is that the tone and approach are just a trifle weighted on the side of systematic theology, as against exegesis, textual criticism, and historical interpretation — which should always come first, and remain permanently in control of research in the field of New Testament theology.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

THE SACRAMENTAL TABLE; A SERIES OF ADDRESSES BY REPRESENTATIVE SCOTS PREACHERS, edited by GEORGE JOHNSTONE JEFFREY. *New York, Harper and Brothers, 1955. 153 pages, $2.50.*

This volume of Communion meditations contributed by fifteen clergymen provides a good cross-section of contemporary Scottish preaching, the best-known names on this side of the Atlantic being Adam Burnet and James Stewart. Each sermon is textually based, about five to six pages in length, and is preceded by a prayer appropriate for a Communion service.

The homiletical level of a volume of this sort is inevitably uneven, ranging from the depth and passion of a preacher such as Stewart on the one hand, to what I fear must be called Kirk stuffiness on the other. But while somewhat uneven, the overall average is high, and at their best these sermons sacramentally communicate the Word through human speech even as they are meant to prepare men's souls for receiving the Word through the Sacrament itself.

One is always impressed by the robustness and clarity of style of the better Scots preachers. Why is it that we Americans so often prefer the longer word to the shorter, the idiomatic to the dignified, the ponderous sentence to the lean? And why, further, do we shun straight-forward theological speaking? Most of these preachers are able to make theology come alive; they are able to emotionalize ideas. Best of all, this is Christological preaching which the sacramental purpose of these sermons alone does not account for. One feels that the Scots are abler at, and more interested in exalting the figure of Christ than in hawking psychology or promoting the British Way of Life!

This reviewer confesses that he read these sermons travelling on bus and train as well as at his office desk. But wherever read, somehow they nourished his soul. For various reasons they will not find their way into his homiletical barrel, primarily because no other man's Communion meditation can ever be a substitute for one's own. But they have found their way—in a fine phrase from the editor's foreword—"into the deep places of the soul."

PAUL WAITMAN HOON

MAKING RELIGION REAL, by NELS F. S. FERRE. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955. 157 pp., $2.00.*

"Religion is sillabub and sponge-cake unless it transforms our experience of the hard side of life and gives us an inner reservoir of grace to overflow whatever life brings."

Though you, dear reader, may label this sentiment as obvious, it gives a sense of the tang with which Dr. Ferré flavors the obvious. Some might feel that the book insults their intelligence and pocketbook, for it seems that we are returned to Freshman English 101 with its instruction in the steps to sound reading and thinking. But the whole force of the volume creeps in silently and one is left with a deep sense of gratitude for having read "Making Religion Real" and for the life of the author who wrote it.

This book has its remarkable qualities. Say you have a friend who is without the benefit of seminary training. Without elaborate construction or labeling, the author will give him a concise understanding of the work of Christ and essential Christian ethics within the framework of a dis-

cussion of stewardship!

Some will want to dissect and mark this as a sourcebook of useful illustrations. Others will find in it many quotable clichés — quotable that is, because they are lifted out of mediocrity by the author's clear and qualifying style.

If the author deals with superficialities in the opening pages (and this is seriously questioned in retrospect) he is justified. The intimate testimony which he wishes to lay before us is withheld to the later chapters on prayer, family life, and suffering. I doubt that he could have done otherwise, else it would have been as distasteful as nudism. This life has been blessed in prayer, family life, and suffering, and for this reason, some of us will remember this book for its moving glimpses of the joy and despair of a devoted life.

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Book Notes

THE BRIDGE, A Yearbook of Judaeo-Christian Studies, VOL. 1, EDITED BY JOHN M. OESTERREICHER. *New York, Pantheon Books, 1955. 349 pp., $3.95.*

This is a promising and valuable first volume in a contemplated series of yearly anthologies sponsored by the Institute of Judaeo-Christian Studies of Seton Hall University. Nineteen Catholic and Jewish scholars, in six Studies, six Perspectives, two Surveys and five Book Reviews, have produced a varied and sometimes brilliant interfaith dialogue. The essays, "Abraham and the Ascent of Conscience", "Marc Chagall, Painter of the Crucified" (four of whose paintings are reproduced), and "The Enigma of Simone Weil", are especially noteworthy and reflect strongly the specifically Catholic understandings of covenant, Christ and conversion. The sponsors and editors of the series seem on principle to exclude Protestant participation (at least in this volume). A more catholic attitude than this (and one which would have permitted a great enrichment of the dialogue) seems to be implied in the noble words of the introductory sections: "It is in the name of the One God that *The Bridge* seeks a meeting of Jews and Christians. This name, however, is for us ever wedded to the name of Christ, a name that keeps Christians and Jews apart. *The Bridge*, then, desires to make understood Him who separates, and those whom He separates. . .Yet, separated though we are, we *are* bretheren, for He over whom Christians and Jews are separated, turns and ties us to them: He is the Bridge."

ALBERT R. VOGELER

CHRISTIAN ETHICS, SOURCES OF THE LIVING TRADITION, edited with INTRODUCTIONS BY WALDO BEACH AND H. RICHARD NIEBUHR. *New York, The Ronald Press, 1955. 496 pp., $5.00.*

Distinguished co-editors have wrought a highly useful volume here. In less than 500 pages they have brought together representative source readings which trace the development of the Christian ideal. Following an ample and perceptive opening chapter on Biblical ethics, fifteen subsequent chapters carry the record from the early Christian church through (among others) St. Augustine, Monasticism, Mysticism, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, Edwards, Rauschenbusch, to a concluding chapter on current trends. The selections are not mere nuggets, but are substantial blocks of material. The full introductions to each chapter are a strong point, preparing the reader for the selections which follow, and comprising in all nearly half of the volume. This work should serve admirably as a text for college and seminary courses. For the minister or layman, it should prove a highly readable short history of Christian thought.

ROBERT F. BEACH

THE DOUGLASS SUNDAY SCHOOL LESSONS, 1956, by EARL L. DOUGLASS. *New York, The Macmillan Co., 1955. 494 pp., $2.95.*

Here is the latest in a well-established series of "Practical Expositions of the International Sunday School Lessons". The author's presentation is conservative. He has blocked out the year's lessons thoughtfully, giving the user helpful suggestions for each week's material. A well-conceived supplement (actually appearing first) provides "Audio-Visual Aid Suggestions" to correspond with the lessons.

R. F. B.

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